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ON THE ROAD TO CIVIL GIDEON:  
FIVE LESSONS FROM THE ENACTMENT OF 
A RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT 
HOMEOWNERS IN FEDERAL CIVIL 
FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS 
Louis S. Rulli* 
INTRODUCTION 
Almost a half century ago, the Supreme Court unanimously 
held in Gideon v. Wainwright that a person accused of a crime 
could not be assured a fair trial unless counsel was provided to 
him.1 On the following day, New York Times journalist Anthony 
Lewis reported that the Court had just handed down one of the 
most important decisions ever in the criminal law field.2 The 
Gideon ruling overturned long-standing precedent established in 
Betts v. Brady that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel 
did not apply to the states, except in cases involving a death 
sentence or special circumstances.  
The Gideon decision prompted national leaders to question 
whether the Court’s landmark ruling should apply to civil 
proceedings when the poor’s most vital interests were at stake. On 
Law Day in 1964, just one year after Gideon, Attorney General 
                                                          
* Practice Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Programs, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School. I would like to thank Benjamin Meltzer of the Biddle 
Law Library at Penn Law School for his valuable assistance. And, in a special 
note of thanks, I would like to express my deep appreciation to two wonderful 
and talented Penn Law students, Andrew Sokol and Brandon McCoy, who ably 
assisted me in completing this project. 
1  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
2  Anthony J. Lewis, Supreme Court Extends Ruling on Free Counsel, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 19, 1963, at 1.   
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Robert F. Kennedy delivered an inspiring challenge to the nation in 
an address at the University of Chicago Law School in which he 
stated: “We have secured the acquittal of an indigent person—but 
only to abandon him to eviction notices, wage attachments, 
repossession of goods and termination of welfare benefits.”3 With 
growing acknowledgment that the phrase “equal justice under law” 
inscribed on the Supreme Court was incomplete without a right to 
counsel in basic civil matters, the civil Gideon movement was 
born.   
It was also at this time that President Lyndon Johnson launched 
the War on Poverty, which for the first time provided federal 
funding to local legal services programs through the Office of 
Economic Opportunity. The purpose of the program was to have 
legal services lawyers for the poor “do no less for their clients than 
does the corporation lawyer checking the Federal Trade 
Commission for sloppy rulemaking, the union lawyer asking 
Congress for repeal of 14(b), or the civil rights lawyer seeking an 
end to segregation in bus stations.”4 In just a few short years, this 
new source of funding resulted in remarkable success for the poor 
in a succession of cases decided by the Supreme Court.5 These 
litigation victories demonstrated the profound impact lawyers 
could have when provided to represent the poor in civil matters. In 
turn, these favorable results generated substantial optimism that 
Gideon’s core principle of fundamental fairness might soon be 
                                                          
3  Robert F. Kennedy, Law Day Address, 13 U. CHI. L. SCH. REC. 24, 26 
(1965); See also Edgar & Jean Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian 
Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317, 1336 n.27 (1964). 
4  History of Civil Legal Aid, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N,   
http://www.nlada.org/About/About_HistoryCivil?printable=yes#oeo (quoting E. 
Clinton Bamberger, First Director of OEO Legal Services) (last visited Jan. 28, 
2011). 
5  See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970); 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 
67, 96 (1972). At the same time, legal services programs also scored significant 
victories for the poor in the circuit courts of appeals. See, e.g., Edwards v. 
Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 
428 F.2d 1071, 1072–73 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Escalera v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 425 
F.2d 853, 867 (2d Cir. 1970).  
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extended to civil proceedings.   
This optimism drew to an abrupt halt with the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham 
County.6 In Lassiter, the Court held that due process of law did not 
require the appointment of counsel for an indigent mother facing 
the government alone in civil court proceedings brought to 
involuntarily terminate her parental rights to her son.7 For many 
years after Lassiter, the civil Gideon movement was dormant in the 
face of increasingly conservative federal courts that appeared 
hostile to expanding fundamental rights.   
Today, however, almost one-half century after Gideon, there is 
renewed optimism that a civil right to counsel to protect basic 
human needs is indeed possible and may even be relatively close at 
hand. With strong support from the organized bar and a coalition 
of diverse interests, there is a flurry of robust experimentation in 
the states reflecting intense determination to establish new 
standards in expanding access to counsel for the poor. Perhaps, 
most importantly, there is a growing acceptance across the land 
that fundamental fairness in our civil justice system requires much 
more than what the Supreme Court was willing to mandate in 
Lassiter.  
The civil Gideon movement moves forward today largely in 
state and local legislatures, state courts, bar sponsored pilot 
programs, and in the court of public opinion. Over time, advocates 
hope that successful outcomes in state and local venues will 
effectively eliminate the Lassiter rule and create a favorable 
climate for the Supreme Court to reconsider and overrule its 
holding in Lassiter, just as it did in Gideon when the time was right 
to reconsider its prior holding in Betts v. Brady.   
Part I of this Article briefly reviews the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Gideon and Lassiter. Part II examines recent 
developments within the states and among numerous bar 
associations that have pumped new life into the civil right to 
counsel movement. Part III takes a close look at reform legislation 
enacted by Congress in 2000 which established a right to counsel 
                                                          
6 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
7 Id. at 32–33. 
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at public expense for indigent homeowners whose primary 
residences are the subject of federal civil asset forfeiture 
proceedings. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 
(“CAFRA”) enacted a broad range of important forfeiture law 
reforms, including a statutory right to counsel for indigents through 
court appointments directed to the Legal Services Corporation. 
CAFRA’s right to counsel in these civil proceedings holds 
important lessons for the current civil right to counsel movement 
and Part IV concludes by identifying and describing five specific 
lessons that can be drawn from that successful legislative effort.   
I. EARLY EFFORTS TO EXTEND A RIGHT TO COUNSEL TO CIVIL 
PROCEEDINGS 
A. The Story of Clarence Gideon 
Clarence Gideon, too poor to hire an attorney, was denied a 
lawyer to defend him against burglary charges brought against him 
by the state of Florida.8 Although the Sixth Amendment guarantees 
an accused the right to counsel in federal criminal proceedings, the 
Supreme Court had long held that the U.S. Constitution offered no 
similar guarantee in state criminal proceedings.9 On the basis of 
state law, a Florida trial judge denied Gideon’s respectful request 
for the appointment of counsel, stating to Mr. Gideon in open 
court:  
I am sorry, but I cannot appoint counsel to represent you in 
this case. Under the laws of the State of Florida, the only 
time the court can appoint counsel to represent a Defendant 
is when that person is charged with a capital offense. I am 
sorry, but I will have to deny your request to appoint 
                                                          
8 Bruce R. Jacob, Memories of and Reflections About Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 33 STETSON L. REV. 181, 200 (2003). Gideon was charged with 
breaking and entering a pool room with the intent to commit a misdemeanor on 
June 3, 1961. This charge was a felony under Florida state law. Id. at 201. 
Gideon was reportedly seen leaving the pool hall with a bottle of wine and his 
pockets filled with coins. Id. at 208. 
9  Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942). 
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counsel to represent you in this case.10 
Without a lawyer to assist him, Gideon was convicted at trial 
based largely on shaky eyewitness testimony. Sentenced to five 
years in prison, Gideon filed a habeas petition to the Florida 
Supreme Court seeking to attack his conviction on the grounds that 
he was wrongfully denied assistance of counsel.11 After the Florida 
Supreme Court denied his petition, Gideon mailed a petition for 
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court asking the high Court to 
accept his case and review whether the denial of counsel was 
unconstitutional.12 The Supreme Court granted review to consider 
whether its prior holding in Betts v. Brady should be 
reconsidered.13  
Notably, one of the first things the Supreme Court did after 
granting review of Gideon’s case was to appoint a lawyer to assist 
Gideon in his appeal.14 The Court chose a highly respected lawyer, 
Abe Fortas, to undertake this important task. Although the Court 
gave no formal reasons for its selection, it may be safely assumed 
                                                          
10  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337 (1963). Arguably, the Florida 
judge was not correct when he stated that he could only appoint counsel in a 
capital case. He could have read the Betts decision to permit an appointment of 
counsel in noncapital felony cases under circumstances where such an 
appointment of counsel is necessary to provide a fair trial to Gideon. See Jacob, 
supra note 8, at 202.   
11  Jacob, supra note 8, at 212–13. 
12  Id. at 214. 
13  Betts v. Brady involved a request for counsel by an accused who was 
indicted for robbery in Maryland state court. Betts, 316 U.S. at 456–57. Betts 
was too poor to afford a lawyer and his request for appointment of counsel was 
denied on the basis that Maryland law did not require appointment of counsel 
except in murder or rape cases. Id. at 457. Betts represented himself, was found 
guilty, and was sentenced to eight years in prison. Id. Upon review, the Supreme 
Court held that the trial court’s refusal to appoint counsel for Betts did not 
necessarily violate due process guarantees. Using a “totality of the facts” 
analysis, the Court treated due process as less rigid and more fluid than other 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights, and held under the facts of the case that the 
denial of counsel was not offensive to common and fundamental understandings 
of fairness. Id. at 461–73. 
14  The Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 4, 1962 and on June 25, 
1962 appointed Abe Fortas, a highly respected partner at Arnold, Fortas & 
Porter, to represent Gideon. Gideon v. Cochran, 370 U.S. 932 (1962).   
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that the Court believed that Fortas had the intellectual firepower 
and ample resources to effectively represent Gideon and, equally 
importantly, to fully develop the important issues for a proper 
disposition by the Court.15   
Fortas brought powerful advocacy to bear on behalf of Gideon. 
In his brief to the Court, Fortas argued that the Fourteenth 
Amendment required that counsel be appointed for an indigent 
defendant in every criminal case involving a serious offense 
because the aid of counsel is indispensable to a fair hearing.16 
Urging the Court to reverse its holding in Betts v. Brady, Fortas’ 
brief concluded with a passage originally written by Erwin 
Griswold and Benjamin Cohen in a letter to the editor of the New 
York Times published shortly after the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Betts:  
[A]t a critical period in world history, Betts v. Brady 
dangerously tilts the scales against the safeguarding of one 
of the most precious rights of man. For in a free world no 
man should be condemned to penal servitude for years 
without having the right to counsel to defend him. The right 
to counsel, for the poor as well as the rich, is an 
indispensable safeguard of freedom and justice under law.17 
                                                          
15  Gideon’s request to the Supreme Court was for a “competent attorney to 
represent [him] in this Court.” BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF 459 (1983). 
At the Court’s conference, Chief Justice Warren suggested that Abe Fortas be 
appointed. Id. See also ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 47 (1964), which 
briefly discusses the appointment of counsel for Gideon, noting that former law 
clerks to the justices are often appointed, as are law professors and established 
practitioners. But, “like other matters decided by the Supreme Court, the choice 
of a lawyer for an indigent petitioner is entirely in the bosom of the justices,” 
Lewis writes. Id. The appointment of Fortas has double significance. First, the 
appointment of any counsel reaffirms that in the proceedings before it, the 
Supreme Court believes that indigent petitioners should be represented. Second, 
it is not simply a matter of having any counsel; the Court values the participation 
of a skilled lawyer who can assist the Court in its decision making while 
advocating for a client. 
16 See generally Brief for the Petitioner, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963) (No. 155), available at 1962 WL 75206. 
17  Id. The letter to the editor was dated July 29, 1942 and published on 
August 2, 1942 in direct response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Betts v. 
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At oral argument on January 15, 1963, Fortas told the justices 
that “a common man with no training in law cannot go up against a 
trained lawyer and win; you cannot have a fair trial without 
counsel.”18   
Legal assistance provided to Clarence Gideon in his appeal 
undoubtedly made a difference.19 In March 1963 a unanimous 
Supreme Court overruled Betts and held that “in our adversary 
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too 
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel 
is provided for him.”20 This basic proposition was deemed so 
fundamental that the justices wrote in their opinion that “this seems 
to us to be an obvious truth.”21 
Today, it is tempting to view the Court’s landmark decision as 
simply a quick stroke of the judicial pen resulting in sweeping 
constitutional change. Such an interpretation, however, would not 
do justice to the difficult battles that preceded the Court’s ruling in 
Gideon and made possible the overruling of longstanding court 
                                                          
Brady, which was decided on June 1, 1942. Griswold and Cohen expressed 
concern that the Court’s holding in Betts v. Brady had not attracted sufficient 
public attention. Benjamin V. Cohen & Erwin N. Griswold, Denial of Counsel 
to Indigent Defendant Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1943, at E6.  They 
argued that the fact that “it is not possible to assure counsel of equal talent to all 
is scarcely an adequate reason for denying to the poor any counsel at all.” Id. 
They also noted that most Americans, before Betts, would have believed that a 
right to counsel in a serious criminal case was already an established part of the 
Bill of Rights. Id. 
18   See generally, LEWIS, supra note 15. Fortas argued that no person, 
however intelligent and smart, could be expected to represent himself effectively 
and that even Clarence Darrow felt he needed a lawyer when he had criminal 
problems. See also Jacob,  supra note 8, at 296 n.477 (2003) (citing Robert J. 
Aalbert, From the Classroom: Gideon’s Trumpet, 12 J. LEG. STUD. EDUC. 321, 
326 n.395 (1994)).   
19  Justice Douglas called Fortas’ argument the best he had heard. See 
generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 15.  
20  Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 15 at 458, 460 
(describing how Betts v. Brady, which held that an indigent defendant did not 
have a due process right to counsel in noncapital cases unless he could not 
obtain a “fair trial,” was overruled by the Supreme Court). 
21  Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
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precedent. Twenty-one years earlier in Betts v. Brady,22 the 
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment did not mandate the 
provision of free counsel to indigent defendants accused of serious 
crimes in state proceedings. Advocates and academics promptly 
questioned the wisdom of the Betts rule.23 In the years that 
followed Betts, many states developed their own paths and 
provided counsel through legislative or judicial means. By the time 
the Court was called upon in Gideon to reconsider its holding in 
Betts, twenty-two states sided with Clarence Gideon in amicus 
filings supporting his claim to appointed counsel. Over time, the 
Betts rule was largely swallowed by exceptions crafted by the 
states about evolving standards as to what fundamental fairness 
principles should require in court proceedings for those too poor to 
afford a lawyer.24 Without these developments, it is uncertain 
when, or even if, the Supreme Court would have reconsidered its 
prior holding in Betts v. Brady. 
B.  The New Legal Services Program  
Although Gideon gave the poor a right to counsel in serious 
criminal proceedings, it did not address their need for counsel in 
civil proceedings. Soon thereafter, advocates for the poor secured 
the birth of a new federal legal services program that opened the 
doors to the nation’s courthouses for many of the poor. Congress 
passed the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, establishing anti-
poverty programs that made federal funds available for legal 
services to the poor. The Office of Economic Opportunity 
(“OEO”), led by Sargent Shriver, worked with local communities 
to solicit initial proposals for legal services funding, and by 1968, 
                                                          
22  See supra note 13 (describing Betts v. Brady). 
23  See e.g., Cohen & Griswold, supra note 17, at E6.  
24  See Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Lessons from 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 527, 533 (2006) 
(discussing the development of a right to counsel in the states through an 
expanding variety of special cases that over time eroded the Betts rule such that 
any serious criminal charge became viewed as a special circumstance warranting 
the appointment of counsel). See also Gideon, 372 U.S. at 350 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
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260 OEO programs were operating throughout the United States.25 
After political opposition to the young program took root in 
California under Governor Ronald Reagan, and later in the Nixon 
White House when President Nixon appointed outspoken legal 
services foe Howard Phillips to head OEO for the purpose of 
dismantling the program, support for an independent legal services 
program gained support. After a protracted legislative fight about 
the structure and scope of this new, independent entity, Congress 
passed the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974. President 
Nixon’s signature on the bill would be one of his last official acts 
before resigning from office that year.26 Under the new Act, the 
legal services program would now be administered by a nonprofit 
corporation governed by an independent board of directors 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.27 
Much of the political opposition to the legal services program 
was generated by the enormous success that it quickly achieved 
once the nation’s court houses were finally open to the poor. 
Attacking long-standing, systemic injustices that preyed upon the 
poor, federally-funded lawyers scored impressive victories in the 
Supreme Court and in many of the nation’s circuit and district 
courts that began to balance the scales of justice that previously 
tilted strongly in the direction of government and large 
corporations. In a short period of time, legal services programs 
won landmark cases that had a profound effect upon the poor. In 
Shapiro v. Thompson,28 Goldberg v. Kelly,29 Fuentes v. Shevin,30 
King v. Smith,31 and Boddie v. Connecticut,32 among others, the 
                                                          
25  See ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, CTR. FOR LAW AND SOC. 
POL’Y SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL 
ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2007), available at http://www.clasp. 
org/publications/legal_aid_history_2007.pdf. 
26  Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 
378.   
27  Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2996c (West 2010). 
28  Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 638 (1969). 
29  See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
30  See generally Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
31  See generally King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). 
32  See generally Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).   
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Supreme Court delivered vital pronouncements that would not 
have been possible without the availability of legal services to the 
poor in the new federal program.33 Indigent Americans were 
beginning to enjoy the fruits of counsel for the first time in civil 
matters; however, they still did not have a right to that counsel. 
C.  Court Action to Secure a Civil Gideon Falls Short in 
Lassiter 
The principal effort to establish a right to counsel in civil 
matters came to the Supreme Court eighteen years later in a legal 
challenge involving the termination of a mother’s parental rights to 
her child in Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of Durham County.34 
Abby Gail Lassiter had been accused of not providing proper 
medical care to William, her infant son. A North Carolina family 
court adjudicated William a neglected child and transferred his 
custody from Lassiter to the county department of social services. 
One year later, Lassiter was convicted of murder charges in an 
unrelated matter and began serving a lengthy sentence of 
imprisonment. Three years after removing William from Lassiter’s 
care, the county department petitioned the court to terminate 
Lassiter’s parental rights alleging that she had not contacted 
William for an extended period of time and had left him in foster 
care for two consecutive years without showing adequate progress 
at remedying the problems that led to his removal from her 
custody.35  
Lassiter was brought from prison to a family court hearing to 
answer charges that her parental rights to William should be 
terminated. When Lassiter asked for a postponement of the hearing 
                                                          
33  The extraordinary record of success before the Supreme Court only tells 
a small part of the story. Legal services programs won cases in federal appellate 
and trial courts that established far reaching legal principles affecting the most 
essential needs of the poor. See, e.g., Escalera v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 425 
F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970); Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. 
Cir. 1970); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
34 See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18, 21 
(1981). 
35 Id. at 20–22. 
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in order to obtain counsel, the trial court refused.36 The judge 
concluded that, despite Lassiter’s poverty and incarceration, she 
had been given ample opportunity to obtain counsel for the hearing 
and that “her failure to do so [was] without just cause.”37  
Without counsel, Lassiter tried unsuccessfully to represent 
herself and her parental rights were terminated.38 On appeal, 
Lassiter argued that she was entitled to the assistance of counsel 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause since she 
was indigent and could not afford to hire counsel.39 A state appeals 
court found that the assistance of counsel was not constitutionally 
mandated, and the North Carolina Supreme Court denied review. 
The United States Supreme Court decided to hear the case. After 
reviewing prior precedent in Gideon, Argersinger,40 and In re 
Gault41 that required the appointment of counsel where a loss of 
liberty was at stake, the high Court held that as liberty interests 
diminish, so does an individual’s right to appointed counsel.42 The 
                                                          
36 Id. at 22. 
37  The Lassiter hearing was held on August 31, 1978. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 
21. In her own defense, Lassiter tried to cross-examine witnesses against her, 
but without much success. Id. at 53–56. The judge reminded her several times 
that she could only ask questions and that her questions were disallowed because 
they were really arguments, and not questions. Id. at 23. At the Supreme Court, 
the American Bar Association filed an amicus brief on the side of Lassiter in 
which it argued that involuntary termination of parental rights cases are prone to 
error and to ensure a fair hearing, an attorney must be made available at public 
expense. ABA Brief for Lassiter as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3–4, 
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cnty., available at 1980 WL 340036 
(No. 79-6432). The ABA’s brief referenced heavily Lassiter’s inability to 
conduct an effective cross-examination of agency witnesses who testified 
against her. Id. at 14. The brief argued that “without meaningful cross-
examination, the risk of error in these cases substantially increases.” Id. “Judges 
will rely more heavily upon the state’s unchallenged presentation.” Id. 
38  Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 21–24. 
39  Id. at 24. 
40  See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that counsel 
must be provided even where the crime is petty and the prison term brief). 
41  See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4 (1967) (holding that a juvenile has a right 
to counsel where his freedom is curtailed by an institutional commitment, even 
though the proceeding is viewed as civil and not criminal). 
42  Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26. 
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Court denied Lassiter’s right to counsel after employing a 
balancing test weighing the due process factors identified in 
Mathews v. Eldridge43 with the presumption against a right to 
counsel without a potential deprivation of physical liberty.44 The 
Court stated, that “a wise public policy . . .  may require . . . higher 
standards . . .” but the Fourteenth Amendment simply “imposes on 
the States the standards necessary to ensure that judicial 
proceedings are fundamentally fair.”45   
In the Court’s view, Lassiter’s case did not involve expert 
witnesses, present any specially troublesome points of law, or 
provide a situation where the presence of counsel could have made 
a determinative difference in the outcome of the case. While the 
Court acknowledged that a parent has an important interest in the 
companionship, care, custody, and management of her child that 
warrants special deference, a majority of the justices did not 
believe that the case presented a situation that warranted 
overcoming the presumption against a right to counsel.   
Lassiter is often erroneously regarded as standing for the 
inflexible principle that civil cases not involving a loss of liberty 
do not require the appointment of counsel. In fact, the Supreme 
Court held that federal courts should evaluate the need for a court-
appointed counsel on a case by case basis, utilizing the Mathews v. 
Eldridge due process factors as a guide.46 But the reality in busy 
trial courts is that a case by case approach often prompts judges to 
adopt an across the board rule from which they rarely deviate. 
Today, trial courts tend to ignore Lassiter’s instruction to inquire 
whether the Mathews factors might require the appointment of 
counsel in the cases before them and instead treat the Lassiter 
                                                          
43  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976) (articulating three 
elements that must be considered in a due process challenge: the private interests 
at stake, the government’s interest, and the risk of an erroneous decision). 
44  Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31. 
45  Id. at 33. 
46  See Michael Millemann, The State Due Process Justification for a Right 
to Counsel in Some Civil Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 733, 734 
(2006) (noting that while Lassiter created a presumption against the right to 
counsel in civil cases that do not involve a loss of liberty, it did establish a case–
by-case approach to determine whether the presumption had been overcome). 
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holding as an absolute rule, except in the most extreme of 
circumstances.47  
In dissent, Justice Blackmun sharply criticized the Lassiter 
majority for adding the value of physical liberty, a “burdensome 
new layer” in his words, to the standard three-factor due process 
framework of Mathews v. Eldridge.48  Justice Blackman disagreed 
strongly with what he perceived as the Court’s retreat from the 
proposition that it look at a whole area (“decision making 
contexts”), and not at individual litigants, when determining if due 
process requires the appointment of counsel.49 Justice Blackmun 
noted the Court’s reasoning in Goldberg v. Kelly,50 in which the 
Court did not look merely at the circumstances of a particular 
litigant, but rather at welfare recipients as an entire class.51 In 
Justice Blackmun’s view, procedural norms must be based on the 
whole context, and not on the specifics of an individual litigant.52 
Despite this strong dissent, federal courts have not reconsidered 
Lassiter’s holding in the decades that have followed and many 
believe that the Supreme Court is no more likely today to disturb 
Lassiter’s holding.53   
                                                          
47  See e.g., Jacob, supra note 8, at 202. 
48  Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
49  Id. at 49–50. 
50  See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).  
51  See generally id. 
52  The ABA resolution recognizes this basic principle and recommends 
that counsel be afforded in the most important subject matter areas involving 
basic human needs, rather than attempting to determine on a case-by-case basis 
the need for legal representation.     
53  Alan W. Houseman, The Future of Civil Legal Aid: A National 
Perspective, 10 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 35, 54 (2007); Dennis Kaufman, The 
Tipping Point on the Scales of Civil Justice, 25 TOURO L. REV. 347, 351 (2009); 
Clare Pastore, Life After Lassiter: An Overview of State-Court Right-to-Counsel 
Decisions, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 186, 194 (2006) (noting that advocates fear 
that the Supreme Court is not in any rush to expand the federal rights of indigent 
litigants); Meredith Hobbs, Litigators Push for ‘Civil Gideon,’ THE RECORDER, 
Dec. 19, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id= 
1202426606743&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 (citing conventional wisdom that the 
federal courts should be avoided because the current Supreme Court is too 
“conservative” for such a “liberal” idea as civil Gideon).    
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 In the absence of a right to counsel, the poor have had very 
limited access to lawyers in civil matters.54 The litigation successes 
of the federal legal services program generated substantial political 
opposition and led to drastic funding cuts in the 1980s under the 
Reagan administration and again in the 1990s, following the 1994 
mid-term elections. In addition, Congress imposed substantial 
restrictions on the activities of legal services lawyers, cutting off 
the poor’s access to lawyers in fundamental ways.55 As inadequate 
funding levels were reduced even further and the legal services 
program again became political fodder, millions of Americans 
were left to handle their legal problems entirely on their own. 
Although legal aid programs enjoy renewed support today from 
public and private funding sources, the harsh reality persists that 
without a right to counsel in civil matters, access to legal help for 
millions of poor Americans remains beyond reach.56 Especially in 
a weak economy, indigent litigants must fend for themselves.57  
                                                          
54  LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN 
AMERICA (2007), available at http://www.lsc.gov/JusticeGap.pdf; AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCIATION, CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC, LEGAL 
NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS (1994), available at 
http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1029845345.31/legalneedsstudy.pdf. 
Numerous studies on legal needs are available through the NLADA website, 
Access to Justice Support Project, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N 
(2004), http://www.nlada.org/Civil/Civil_SPAN/SPAN_Library/document_list? 
topics=000055&list_title=State+Legal+Needs+Studies%3A+Reports.  
55  For example, Congress prohibited legal services programs receiving 
federal funds from engaging in class actions, seeking attorneys’ fees, prisoner 
representation, representing individuals who were being evicted from public 
housing because they face criminal charges of selling or distributing illegal 
drugs, most activities involving welfare reform, lobbying, and representing 
people who are not U.S. citizens with certain limited exceptions. See Omnibus 
Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 
110 Stat. 1321. In fiscal year 2010, Congress removed the restriction on 
collecting or retaining attorneys’ fees. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-117 (2010). 
56  See legal needs studies discussed infra note 54.   
57  See, e.g., Terry Carter, Judges Say Litigants are Increasingly Going Pro 
Se at Their Own Peril, A.B.A.J.  (July 12, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
news/article/judges_say_litigants_increasingly_going_pro_se--at_their_own_/ 
(reporting on a survey conducted of ABA Judicial Division’s National 
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II. THE ORGANIZED BAR TAKES A BOLD STAND  
With a decisive loss in Lassiter, the movement to achieve a 
civil Gideon languished for many years. As federal courts became 
increasingly unreceptive to expansive readings of constitutional 
protections, advocates generally agreed that a landmark Supreme 
Court decision mandating a right to counsel in civil matters, 
similar to what the Supreme Court had done in Gideon, was not 
likely to be achieved in the near future.58 Instead, proponents 
devoted their efforts to expanding access to counsel by creating 
justice commissions under the auspices of state supreme courts and 
uniting behind national efforts to increase federal funding for legal 
services to the poor. These efforts opened up access to counsel for 
perhaps millions of Americans in a broad range of civil matters, 
funded by state IOLTA programs, civil filing fees, bar registration 
fees, and a range of other mechanisms intended to boost legal 
services to the poor. Despite these important developments, 
advocates were unable to make substantial process at chipping 
away at the fundamental justice gap in America which, according 
to most studies, reveals that only 20 percent of poor Americans in 
need of legal help are able to be helped with current resources.59 A 
study commissioned by the Legal Services Corporation found that 
for every indigent client who was able to get free legal help from a 
legal aid office another client entering with an equal need of help 
was turned away.60 Without a right to counsel, the justice gap 
                                                          
Conference of State Trial Judges). 
58  Civil Gideon advocates generally agreed that they should avoid federal 
courts when trying to advance their efforts. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 53, at 
351 (noting that the conventional wisdom among civil Gideon advocates was to 
avoid federal courts based upon the assumption that the Supreme Court was too 
conservative to find a right to counsel in the constitution).   
59  See infra notes 81–842 for a study conducted by the American Bar 
Association and other studies of states citing the statistic; LEGAL SERVICES 
CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT 
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW INCOME AMERICANS, LEGAL SERVICES 
CORP. (2d ed. 2007), available at http://www.lsc.gov/justicegap.pdf (stating that 
less than one in five of the legal problems experienced by low-income people 
are addressed with the assistance of a private or legal aid lawyer). 
60  See LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN 
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remains as large as ever. 
A.  The ABA’s Right to Counsel Resolution 
In 2005, then ABA president Michael Greco commissioned a 
presidential task force on access to civil justice to study whether 
counsel should be provided as a matter of right in civil matters to 
those unable to afford counsel.61 The task force, chaired by 
Howard Dana, Jr., concluded that equality before the law has 
remained a woefully inadequate charity over the past 130 years 
which has not delivered justice for all. The task force 
recommended that the ABA support a right to counsel at the public 
expense in civil matters involving basic human needs.62 On August 
7, 2006, the ABA House of Delegates adopted Resolution 112A 
calling upon federal and state jurisdictions to provide counsel as a 
matter of right at the public expense to low-income persons in 
adversarial proceedings involving “basic human needs,” such as 
those involving “shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child 
custody.”63 The ABA resolution encouraged each jurisdiction to 
determine appropriate categories where the provision of counsel 
was most important and to develop local strategies for achieving 
this goal.   
The ABA’s action reignited a national movement in support of 
                                                          
AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME 
AMERICANS (2005), available at http://www.lsc.gov/press/documents/LSC%20 
Justice%20 
Gap_FINAL_1001.pdf.  
61  See Michael S. Greco, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, Address to the Am. 
Bar Ass’n House of Delegates at the 2005 Annual Meeting 5 (Aug. 8, 2005), 
available at http://abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/files-flutter/1273007637 
grecohod0805.pdf. 
62  See Am. Bar Ass’n House of Delegates, Task Force on Civil Justice, 
Report to the House of Delegates, Res. 112A, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 7, 2006), 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A112A.pdf. 
63  Id. The ABA’s resolution calls upon “federal, state, and territorial 
governments to provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to 
low-income persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic 
human needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, 
health or child custody, as determined by each jurisdiction.” Id. 
RULLI - FINAL.DOC 5/9/2011  4:04 PM 
 On the Road to Civil Gideon 699 
a right to counsel that had begun to show promise in some states.64 
State and local bar associations agreed to co-sponsor the ABA 
resolution,65 and academic institutions held conferences to 
reexamine the legal underpinnings of a civil Gideon.66 The subject 
again became prominent in academic journals and practitioner 
publications.67 Many states and localities soon followed this lead,68 
amidst new-found optimism that a right to counsel in essential civil 
legal matters might indeed be obtainable. 
                                                          
64  See generally Laura K. Abel, Keeping Families Together, Saving 
Money, and Other Motivations Behind New Civil Right to Counsel Laws, 42 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1087 (2009) (describing the enactment of laws expanding the 
right to counsel in civil cases). 
65  Among the co-sponsors were the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York, King County Bar Association (WA), the Philadelphia Bar 
Association, the Maine State Bar Association, the Connecticut Bar Association, 
the Boston Bar Association, the Los Angeles County Bar Association, and a 
variety of others. For a complete list, see the ABA website, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Aug. 2006), available at http://www. 
abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A112A.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 
2010).  
66  See, e.g., Michael S. Greco, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, Keynote Address 
at 23rd Annual Edward V. Sparer Symposium: Civil Gideon: Making the Case 
(Mar. 28, 2006), available at http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/657 
133a8-1f28-4b23-8eed-68c80a993521/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2cd 
67c73-a372-4605-8f34-712879228d98/Greco_03_28_06.pdf; 2006 Edward V. 
Sparer Symposium, Civil Gideon: Creating a Constitutional Right to Counsel in 
the Civil Context, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 507 (2006). See also 
Symposium, An Obvious Truth: Creating an Action Blueprint for a Civil Right 
to Counsel in New York State, 25 TOURO L. REV. 1 (2009); Symposium, Access 
to Justice: It’s Not For Everyone, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 859 (2009); 
Symposium, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Civil Gideon in Maryland & 
Beyond, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 1 (2007); Symposium, ABA Symposium on Access 
to Justice, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (2010).   
67  A Right to a Lawyer? Momentum Grows, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 163 
(July–Aug. 2006); Paul Marvey, Advocacy for a Right to Counsel: An Update, 
42 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 644 (Mar.–Apr. 2008). See also Russell Engler, 
Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideon from the Dynamics of Social Change, 15 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 697 (2006) [hereinafter Engler, Shaping]. See 
generally Symposium, ABA Symposium on Access to Justice, 37 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1 (2010).     
68  For example, the Pa. Bar Ass’n passed a right to counsel resolution in 
Sept. 2007 and commissioned a task force to implement this policy. 
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B.  Experimentation in the States   
Many believe that the key to success in the civil Gideon 
movement lies with growing experimentation in the states. In the 
twenty-one intervening years between the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Betts and Gideon, most states adopted right to counsel statutes 
for serious criminal offenses, and by the time Gideon was argued 
twenty-two states agreed to sign on as amici curiae parties 
supporting Gideon’s position. Only Florida and two other states, 
Alabama and North Carolina, advocated for the retention of the 
Betts rule. This clear change among the states signaled an 
important message that had a significant impact upon the Court. 
Similar developments over time on the civil side are also likely to 
have a persuasive impact, especially upon judges who believe the 
law should evolve slowly as the nation’s views develop.69   
One of the more promising state court initiatives in the civil 
Gideon movement preceded the ABA’s right to counsel resolution. 
In Frase v. Barnhart,70 a Maryland child custody case, advocates 
asked their highest state court to decide whether the poor can hope 
to receive equal treatment as a matter of fundamental constitutional 
rights if they have no access to legal help. While the Maryland 
Court of Appeals decided the case on other grounds and did not 
reach the right of counsel issue, three of the seven justices would 
have found such a right under the Declaration of Rights of 
Maryland’s state constitution.71 Not constrained by the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the federal constitution in Lassiter, the 
                                                          
69  For a discussion of state statutes guaranteeing a right to counsel in 
parental termination cases and other civil matters, see Laura K. Abel & Max 
Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 40 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 245 (2006); see generally Rosalie R. Young, The Right to 
Appointed Counsel in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings: The States’ 
Response to Lassiter, 14 TOURO L. REV. 247 (1997). 
70  See generally Frase v. Barnhart, 840 A.2d 114 (Md. 2003). See also 
John Nethercut, Maryland’s Strategy for Securing a Right to Counsel in Civil 
Cases: Frase v. Barnhart and Beyond, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 238, 239 (2006) 
(concluding that challenges of Lassiter based on federal constitutional grounds 
were unlikely to succeed, but that a greater chance of success existed based upon 
state constitutional guarantees).  
71  Barnhart, 840 A.2d at 126.   
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three Maryland justices acknowledged the historic path they were 
proposing by mandating a civil Gideon and the concerns it raised, 
but they responded with their own question: “What could be more 
important?”72 
While state litigation seeking to establish a right to counsel in 
selected areas of civil needs remains an important thrust of the 
right to counsel movement,73 advocates for a civil right to counsel 
have also turned their attention to a broad range of other advocacy 
measures.74 State and local bar associations have adopted similar 
resolutions to that of the ABA urging increased access to justice 
through the establishment of a right to counsel,75 and they have 
recommended legislative change to amend state constitutions.76 
They have sponsored state and local legislation77 and have 
                                                          
72  Id. at 103, 141. 
73  See, e.g., Office of Public Advocacy v. Alaska Court System, Randall 
Guy Gordanier, et al., No. S-12999 (Alaska 2008) (Alaska custody); In re 
McBride, 766 N.W.2d 857 (Mich. 2009) (parental rights termination); Frase, 
840 A.2d 114; Bellevue School Dist. v. E.S., 199 P.3d 1010 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2009) (truancy). See also Millemann, supra note 46, at 748 (discussing state 
constitutional litigation challenges involving a right to counsel). 
74  See generally Paul Marvy & Laura Klein Abel, Current Developments 
in Advocacy to Expand the Civil Right to Counsel, 25 TOURO L. REV. 131 
(2009). 
75  See, e.g., Alaska Bar Association (Sept. 11, 2008); Hawaii State Bar 
Association (Dec. 2007); Massachusetts Bar Association (May 23, 2007); 
Pennsylvania Bar Association (Nov. 2007); Philadelphia Bar Association 
(original co-sponsor of ABA resolution and additional resolutions, April 30, 
2009). 
76  See California, Conference of Delegates of California Bar Association 
(Oct. 2006) (recommending legislation to amend state constitution in order to 
create a right to counsel where basic human needs are at stake). 
77  In October 2009, Governor Schwarzenegger of California signed the 
Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act providing funding for a two year pilot project 
to provide poor individuals a lawyer in certain high stakes cases (anticipated to 
include domestic violence claims, child custody cases, and housing matters). See 
Gary Toohey, A Civil Right to Counsel: Inevitable or Unrealistic, PRECEDENT, 
Winter 2010, at 23, available at http://members.mobar.org/pdfs/precedent/ 
feb10/civil.pdf (citing California Recognizes Civil Right to Counsel, Creates 
Pilot Program, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, http://www.brennancenter.org/ 
content/elert/lselert1016091 (last visited Aug. 11, 2010)). See 2009 Cal. Legis. 
Serv. 457 (West 2009). 
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established state model statutes.78 For example, Florida adopted a 
right to counsel statute in 2005 requiring legal representation for 
children determined to be eligible for special immigrant juvenile 
status so that they could apply for that status.79 In New York, the 
State Judiciary recently established a program aimed at providing 
for a right to counsel for homeowners facing foreclosure. The 
program will be initially implemented in two New York counties 
and may eventually be put in place throughout the state.80   
Advocates have also fostered state justice commissions81 and 
bar association task forces.82  These have spurred pilot projects,83 
                                                          
78  See, for example, California’s Cal. Comm’n on Access to Justice, State 
Equal Justice Act, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, www.brennancenter.org/ 
page/-/d/download_file_38656.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2011), and Cal. Comm’n 
on Access to Justice, State Basic Access Act, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 
(Feb. 8, 2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Justice/State%20Basic%20 
Access%20Act%20Feb%2008.pdf, developed by the Task Force of California 
Access to Justice Commission.    
79  See Marvy & Abel, supra note 74, at 131;  2005 Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. 
245 (codified at Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.5075(5)) (West 2010). 
80  See David Streitfeld, New York Courts Vow Legal Aid in Housing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, at B1.  See also JONATHAN LIPPMAN, CHIEF JUDGE OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 2011: PURSUING JUSTICE 7–
8 (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/admin/stateofjudiciary/SOJ-
2011.pdf. 
81  See, e.g., MD. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, INTERIM REPORT & 
RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2009), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/ 
mdatjc/pdfs/interimreport111009.pdf (Maryland Access to Justice Commission 
was created in 2008); N.H. CITIZENS COMM’N ON THE STATE COURTS, REPORTS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (2006) (studying the implementation of civil 
Gideon); see also Abel, supra note 24, at 534–35 (noting that a number of states 
have access to justice commissions with high ranking legislators and judges 
participating). 
82  See, e.g., BOS. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHT 
TO COUNSEL, GIDEON’S NEW TRUMPET: EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL IN MASS. (2008), available at http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/ 
nr_0809/GideonsNewTrumpet.pdf; MINN. BAR ASSOC., REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATION TO THE MSBA REGARDING FUNDING FOR THE MSBA CIVIL 
GIDEON TASK FORCE (2008), available at http://www.mnbar.org/committees/ 
CivilGideon/MaterialsReports/AppropriationRequest2008.pdf; PA. BAR ASSOC. 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMMITTEE, RESOLUTION TO COSPONSOR THE ABA’S 
RESOLUTIONS TO ADOPT THE PROPOSED ABA MODEL ACCESS ACT AND ABA 
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academic conferences,84 and a significant body of published 
writings.85 As individual efforts go forward, information and 
strategies are exchanged as part of a National Coalition for a Civil 
Right to Counsel which maintains a website and provides 
assistance to local efforts.86 Finally, at its 2010 annual meeting, the 
ABA adopted a Model Access Act to provide a model statute for 
                                                          
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF A RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 
(2010), available at http://www.pabar.org/public/committees/lspublic/ 
Resolutions/Resolution%20to%20Cosponsor%20ABA%20Model%20Act%20a
pproved%20_2_.pdf; PHILA. BAR ASSOC., RESOLUTION ADOPTION AND 
SUPPORTING THE PRELIMINARY REPORT, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE CHANCELLOR’S TASK FORCE ON CIVIL GIDEON (2009), available at 
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/ResNov1909_03?appNum=4. 
83  Massachusetts launched two pilot projects with the Boston Bar 
Foundation to explore the impact of full representation in eviction cases. See 
Pilots, CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, available at http://www.civilrighttocounsel. 
org/advances/pilots/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).   
84  See, e.g., Announcement, Edward V. Sparer Conference at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School (March 28, 2006), available at 
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/Web
ServerResources/CMSResources/civilgideonsymposiumflyer.pdf. See also 
ABA, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 5–7 (2010), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/sclaid/ 
downloads/105_Revised_FINAL_Aug_2010.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing 
academic conferences at St. Thomas Law School and Touro Law School, and a 
Washington  conference co-sponsored by Seattle University School of Law, 
University of Washington School of Law, and Gonzaga University School of 
Law); Press Release, Pa. Bar Ass’n, Civil Gideon Plenary Session April 10 
(Apr. 8, 2008), available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/NewsItem? 
appNum=2&newsItemID=1000768; Albert S. Dandridge, III, ‘Outrage’ Needed 
for Civil Gideon Success, PHILA. BAR REPORTER 4 (August 2010) (discussing 
the July 7, 1010 Chancellor’s Forum on Civil Gideon).  
85  See, e.g., Abel & Rettig, supra note 69, at 245; Russell Engler, 
Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal 
About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37 (2010) 
[hereinafter Engler, Connecting]; Engler, Shaping, supra note 67, at 697; Earl 
Johnson, Jr., Will Gideon’s Trumpet Sound a New Melody? The Globilization of 
Constitutional Values and its Implications for a Right to Equal Justice in Civil 
Cases, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 201 (2003). 
86  See Get Involved, NATIONAL COALITION FOR A CIVIL RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL, http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/about_the_coalition/get_involved/ 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2011).  
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states and localities to use in their varied efforts to establish and 
administer a civil right to counsel, accompanied by a report 
presenting basic principles of a right to counsel in civil legal 
proceedings.87   
Despite a growing number of court and legislative initiatives in 
states and localities, advocates have experienced difficulty in 
getting their hands around the most effective next steps that should 
be taken in pursuit of a civil Gideon. Should advocates focus their 
efforts on state courts in an attempt to get favorable rulings under 
state constitutional guarantees? Should they focus on lobbying 
state legislatures for legislation that mandates counsel at the public 
expense in compelling subject matters that most directly address 
essential needs? Should they turn to local legislatures where 
elected officials are most closely tied to basic human needs and 
may be particularly sensitive to local concerns?   
Or, instead, should advocates engage in an aggressive public 
education campaign that informs citizens that a reading of their 
Miranda rights which they often hear on television crime shows, 
about having a lawyer appointed if one cannot be afforded, does 
not apply to even the most important of civil cases?88 
Alternatively, should advocates establish bar- or foundation-
sponsored pilot projects that will integrate empirical studies to 
measure the success of their efforts and the true societal costs of 
not providing counsel when basic human needs are at stake? While 
there are no certain or easy answers to these questions and each 
locality must decide for itself which path best matches its own 
unique needs and concerns, there are lessons to be learned from the 
efforts of others to expand access to counsel in discrete civil 
matters. 
                                                          
87  The ABA’s Model Access Act for implementation of a civil right to 
counsel, MODEL ACCESS ACT § 104 (2010), and accompanying Basic Principles 
of a Right to Counsel in Civil Proceedings, MODEL ACCESS ACT § 105 (2010), 
were adopted at the ABA’s annual meeting in August 5–10, 2010 in San 
Francisco. See ABA Announcements, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/aba_announcements2/.    
88  Interestingly, almost four-fifths incorrectly believe that the poor already 
have a right to legal aid in civil cases. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1792 (2001). 
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III. CIVIL FORFEITURE REFORM AND A RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR 
INDIGENT HOMEOWNERS  
A. Introduction to Civil Forfeiture 
The power of the government to seize contraband and obtain its 
forfeiture is a law enforcement tool as old as the nation.89 In 1983, 
President Ronald Reagan declared war on drug racketeers in a 
State of the Union message and promoted strong federal forfeiture 
measures when he signed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
of 1984.90 While civil and criminal forfeiture had been used to 
fight drug trafficking since the early 1970s, the 1984 legislation 
extended the reach of civil forfeiture to real estate that is used to 
facilitate drug transactions.   
Civil forfeiture actions are in rem proceedings brought against 
the offending property on the theory that it is the property that 
makes possible the illegal conduct. As a result, the action is not 
brought against the property owner and the guilt or innocence of 
the property owner is not determinative of the outcome in a civil 
forfeiture action. The theory behind civil forfeiture is that the 
property has done wrong by facilitating illegal drug activity and 
that the government can eliminate illegal drug activity by taking 
the profit out of drug offenses. At the same time, the government’s 
use of civil forfeiture as a drug-fighting tool can recoup drug 
enforcement costs and amass significant sums that are available for 
future law enforcement activities.  
As law enforcement authorities gained financial success 
through civil forfeiture, they became more aggressive in their use 
of forfeiture proceedings. Many critics charged that harsh 
penalties, minimal safeguards, and relaxed procedures provided in 
civil forfeiture statutes trampled on the rights of ordinary citizens 
                                                          
89  From the earliest days of the Republic, cargo ships were subject to 
federal forfeiture laws. See historical discussion of forfeiture in Caldero-Toledo 
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974). 
90  See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 
Stat. 1976 (1984). See also ANDREW WHITFORD, PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND 
THE PUBLIC AGENDA: CONSTRUCTING THE WAR ON DRUGS 55–63 (2009) 
(discussing President Reagan’s zero tolerance policies on drug-related crimes). 
RULLI - FINAL.DOC 5/9/2011  4:04 PM 
706 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
who were often innocent themselves of any wrongdoing.91 Federal 
courts expressed growing concern over government forfeiture 
practices in the cases before them.92 The cry for forfeiture reform 
among interest groups and in the media mounted, leading to the 
introduction of reform legislation in Congress.93 Representative 
Henry Hyde wrote a popular book, entitled Forfeiting Our 
Property Rights, Is Your Property Safe from Seizure?, in which he 
expressed concern that the war on drugs had become a “series of 
frontal attacks on basic American constitutional guarantees . . . .”94 
                                                          
91  See Naftali Bendavid, Asset Forfeiture, Once Sacrosanct, Now Appears 
Ripe for Reform, LEGAL TIMES, July 5, 1993, at 1; Louis Rulli, Access to Justice 
and Civil Forfeiture Reform: Providing Lawyers for the Poor and Recapturing 
Forfeited Assets for Impoverished Communities, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 507, 
512–13 (1998).  
92  See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 
43, 82 n.1 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. $31,990,982 in U.S. 
Currency, F.2d 851, 856 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. All Assets of Statewide 
Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 905 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. One Parcel 
of Property, 964 F.2d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 1992), rev’d., Austin v. United States, 
509 U.S. 602 (1993); United States v. $506,231 in U.S. Currency, 125 F.3d 442, 
454 (7th Cir. 1997); Jones v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 819 F. Supp. 698, 
724 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).      
93  On June 15, 1993, Representative Henry Hyde introduced H.R. 2417, 
known as the Civil Forfeiture Act of 1993, the first initiative in a seven year 
battle to obtain reform that would ultimately culminate in CAFRA. See Civil 
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, H.R. 2417, 103rd Cong. (1993). The Hyde Bill 
attempted to heighten the government’s burden of proof, provide for the 
appointment of counsel and eliminate cost bonds, among other things. See id. 
Congressman John Conyers Jr., a Democrat from Michigan, introduced H.R. 
3347, known as the Asset Forfeiture Justice Act, Asset Forfeiture Justice Act, 
H.R. 3347, 103rd Cong. (1993), after holding hearings on forfeiture reform. See 
Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Legislation and National Security of the House Comm. on Government 
Operations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 12–13 (1992). Conyers’ bill would have 
eliminated in rem forfeiture proceedings, requiring instead that the owner of 
property be convicted of a crime upon which the forfeiture is based before 
allowing the government to forfeit property. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 
H.R. 2417, 103rd Cong. (1993). 
94  HENRY HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS, IS YOUR PROPERTY 
SAFE FROM SEIZURE? 1 (Cato Institute 1995). Representative Hyde plainly 
voiced his opinion in his book: “My personal belief, which prompted my writing 
this book, is that there is an immediate need for restoration of the constitutional 
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In his book, he called for many reforms, including the appointment 
of counsel for indigents.95 
The demand for forfeiture reform recognized from the start that 
property owners needed greater access to counsel if property rights 
were to be adequately protected. Some began to argue that 
property owners were constitutionally entitled to counsel in civil 
forfeiture proceedings. Since many aspects of civil forfeiture 
closely resemble criminal proceedings, and civil forfeiture is 
acknowledged to be “quasi-criminal” and punitive in nature, 
advocates argued that property owners enjoyed a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in civil forfeiture cases and were 
entitled to have counsel appointed for them under the Criminal 
Justice Act.96 However, the Supreme Court has not deemed 
forfeiture actions to be criminal proceedings for the purposes of 
entitlement to counsel,97 leaving to lower federal courts the 
responsibility of deciding the constitutional dimensions of this 
issue in individual cases. 
B.  Court Efforts to Obtain a Right to Counsel  
Thus far, efforts through the courts to establish a right to 
counsel in civil forfeiture proceedings have achieved momentary 
victories, but not lasting success. In United States v. Bowman,98 a 
                                                          
principles that are debased by the current application of asset forfeiture laws.” 
Id. at 4. 
95  Id. at 81 (proposing that anyone financially unable to obtain 
representation in a federal civil forfeiture matter be appointed counsel, paid with 
funds from the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund). 
96  See, e.g., United States v. 1604 Oceola, 803 F. Supp 1194 (N.D. Tex. 
1992). The Criminal Justice Act authorizes payment for appointed counsel on 
behalf of financially eligible individuals who have a Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. See Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(a)(1)(H) (West 2010). 
97  See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 608 n.4 (1993) (holding that 
some constitutional protections apply to civil forfeiture, but unless a civil 
forfeiture proceeding is so punitive that it must reasonably be considered 
criminal, counsel is not required to be appointed).  United States v. 7108 West 
Grand Ave., Chicago, Ill., 15 F.3d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 1994).   
98  United States v. Bowman, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1244 (N.D. Ala. 2003), 
vacated, No. CR-03-C-0056-E, 2003 WL 23272667 (N.D. Ala. 2003).  
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district court in Alaska held that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed 
a lawyer to a claimant in a civil forfeiture proceeding. Unwilling to 
“exalt form over substance,” the Alaska court rejected the 
government’s argument that the Sixth Amendment’s right to 
counsel does not attach because forfeiture actions, being in rem 
rather than in personam, are not adversarial proceedings. 
Ultimately, however, the order and opinion in the case were 
vacated based upon plea arguments entered in the case.99  
The legal claim that the Sixth Amendment provides a right to 
counsel in civil forfeiture proceedings has been rejected by federal 
appellate courts in the Second,100 Sixth,101 Seventh,102 Ninth,103 
Tenth,104 and Eleventh105 circuits on the basis that civil forfeiture 
statutes authorize the forfeiture of property and not the 
imprisonment of the property owner.106 
Advocates seeking to establish a right to counsel in civil 
forfeiture proceedings in state courts have not fared any better. In a 
case of first impression, a Pennsylvania intermediate appellate 
court held that an indigent property owner was entitled to counsel 
in civil forfeiture actions under the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.107 The court acknowledged that forfeiture 
                                                          
99  See United States v. Bowman, No. CR-03-C-0056-E, 2003 WL 
23272667 (N.D. Ala. 2003). 
100  See United States v. 87 Blackheath Road, 201 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2000). 
101  United States v. Mitchell Ave., 149 F.3d 472, 475 (6th Cir. 1998). 
102  United States v. 7108 W. Grand Ave., 15 F.3d 632 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 512 U.S. 1212 (1994). 
103  Acosta v. United States, 130 Fed. Appx. 881 (9th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. $292,288.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(finding there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel because civil forfeiture 
statutes authorize the forfeiture of property and not the imprisonment of the 
property owner). 
104  United States v. Deninno, 103 F.3d 82, 86 (10th Cir. 1996). 
105  United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d 1304, 1311–12 (11th 
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1083 (2000). 
106  See also United States v. All Funds on Deposit in any and all Accounts, 
2009 WL 2424337 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that a property owner is not 
entitled to an appointment of counsel because the Sixth Amendment’s 
protections are confined to criminal prosecutions). 
107  Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. $9,847.00 U.S. Currency, 637 A.2d 
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law is a “complicated and abstruse” field that poses substantial 
burdens for a pro se litigant.108 Influenced by the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s holding that the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines 
clause applied to civil forfeiture proceedings,109 Pennsylvania’s 
Commonwealth Court concluded that appointment of counsel was 
constitutionally required under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process clause in order to protect an indigent property owner from 
the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of his property.  
This decision was short-lived. Three years later, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court 
and held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not require the appointment of counsel for an indigent property 
owner.110  Applying the Supreme Court’s balancing test announced 
in Mathews v. Eldridge, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found 
the burden to government of providing counsel to a class of 
property claimants to be substantial and the risk of erroneous 
deprivation to property owners minimal. Without a liberty interest 
at risk, the Court held that a proper application of Mathews 
weighed against a property claimant’s entitlement to counsel in 
civil forfeiture actions.111 Other state courts have similarly 
declined to find a right to counsel in civil forfeiture proceedings.112 
C.  Legislative Reform 
As judicial efforts to obtain a constitutional right to counsel in 
                                                          
736, 741 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994), rev’d, 704 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1997). 
108  $9,847.00 U.S. Currency, 637 A.2d at 743. 
109  Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).   
110  Commonwealth v. $9,847.00 U.S. Currency, 704 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1997). 
111  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not consider whether the 
Pennsylvania Constitution might require counsel under circumstances not 
required by the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 617. 
112  See, e.g., State v. $1,010.00 in American Currency, 722 N.W. 2d 92 
(SD 2009) (holding no Sixth Amendment right attached because the action was 
not a criminal proceeding, and rejecting the argument that state law required the 
appointment of counsel on the basis of equity considerations). See also State v. 
Halvorson, 724 N.W. 2d 703 (Table) (Wis. App. 2006); State v. Hermann, 719 
N.W. 2d 800 (Table) (Wis. App. 2006); In re Property Seized from Behmer, 720 
N.W. 2d 191 (Table), 2006 WL 1279318 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006). 
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civil forfeiture actions proved largely unsuccessful, advocacy 
shifted to the legislature. With a growing number of publicized 
incidents of forfeiture abuse and increasing concern that innocent 
owners forfeited property without sufficient legal protection,113 
Congress embarked on a seven year effort to reform the nation’s 
civil forfeiture laws. These legislative efforts began in the House 
of Representatives and ultimately obtained consensus in the 
Senate, culminating in the passage of the Civil Asset Forfeiture 
Reform Act of 2000 (“CAFRA”).   
The new legislation enacted important safeguards to achieve 
procedural fairness and enable average citizens to contest forfeiture 
claims brought against their property. The reform statute created a 
uniform innocent owner defense for all federal civil forfeiture 
statutes and heightened the government’s burden required to prove 
that private property was subject to forfeiture.114 Representative 
Henry Hyde, a primary architect of CAFRA’s reforms, spoke 
proudly of the Act’s accomplishments: “It returns civil asset 
forfeiture to the ranks of respected law-enforcement tools that can 
be used without risk to the civil liberties and property rights of 
American citizens. We are all better off that this is so.”115   
While CAFRA included many important civil legal protections 
for ordinary citizens, the Act’s expanded right to counsel is 
considered by some to be among its most important reforms.116 In 
proposing legislative reform, the House Judiciary Committee’s 
report recommended “eight core reforms”117 to civil forfeiture law, 
of which the appointment of counsel was listed second only to 
reform of the burden of proof.118 Acknowledging that there is no 
                                                          
113  See HYDE, supra note 94, at 5–6. 
114  See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(c) (West 
2010). Under the new Act, the government is now required to meet a 
preponderance of the evidence standard in order to demonstrate the forfeitability 
of property. Id. 
115  See Stephen Labaton, Congress Raises Burden of Proof on Asset 
Seizures, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 2000, at A1. 
116  See 1 DAVID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE 
CASES P 1.02[2]-[3] (Matthew Binder 2010). 
117  H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 11 (1999). 
118  The eight core reforms proposed in H.R. 1658 are outlined in Report 
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Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel for indigents in civil 
forfeiture cases, the report nonetheless expresses the Committee’s 
conclusion that civil forfeiture proceedings are “so punitive in 
nature that appointed counsel should be made available for those 
who are indigent, or made indigent by seizure in appropriate 
circumstances.”119 
The Hyde-Conyers Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (House 
Bill 1658) passed the House of Representatives in 1999 by an 
overwhelming vote of 375 to 48. As negotiations continued with 
the Department of Justice, Senators Hatch and Leahy introduced 
Senate Bill 1931. The Senate bill rejected the broader grant of 
authority for appointed counsel found in the House bill, and 
instead provided for the appointment of counsel only where an 
indigent’s primary residence was the subject of the proceeding. 
Negotiations with Senators Sessions and Schumer led to agreement 
on thirty substantive changes and the addition of new sections 
giving additional authority to law enforcement to utilize criminal 
forfeiture powers. These new additions included the provision of 
counsel for indigent homeowners seeking to defend against civil 
forfeiture of their primary residences, utilizing the Legal Services 
Corporation as the conduit for the implementation of a right to 
counsel. Promising “to do the right thing on this important issue of 
fairness,” the Senate bill included a “right to counsel” provision for 
a limited class of civil asset forfeiture proceedings.120 This 
provision was adopted in the final text of the bill that was 
ultimately signed into law by President Clinton in April of 2000.121 
                                                          
106-192 as the following: Burden of proof, appointment of counsel, innocent 
owner defense, return of property upon showing of hardship, compensation for 
damage to property while in the government’s possession, elimination of cost 
bond, adequate time to contest forfeiture, and interest. Id. at 11–19. 
119 Id. at 14. While the Judiciary Committee reported H.R. 1658 favorably 
to the House of Representatives by a vote of 27-3, the dissenting view expressed 
in the Committee’s report took issue with the expanded provision for 
appointment of counsel, believing that the bill lacked substantial safeguards to 
protect against abuse of this provision. The dissenting view also noted that 
successful challenges to forfeiture were already eligible to recover attorneys’ 
fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Id. at 20, 34.    
120  146 CONG. REC. 3656 (2000).  
121  See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(b)(2)(A) 
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The text of this provision set forth the parameters of this right: 
If a person with standing to contest the forfeiture of 
property in a judicial civil forfeiture proceeding under a 
civil forfeiture statute is financially unable to obtain 
representation by counsel, and the property subject to 
forfeiture is real property that is being used by the person 
as a primary residence, the court, at the request of the 
person, shall insure that the person is represented by an 
attorney for the Legal Services Corporation with respect to 
the claim.122 
The right to counsel provided for attorney compensation at 
levels equivalent to that provided for other court-appointed 
representation,123 and required that the Legal Services Corporation 
submit statements of reasonable fees and costs during the course of 
the representation for court review.124 At its core, the newly 
created right was intended to protect the family home against 
erroneous deprivation under harsh civil forfeiture laws.125 
Significantly, protection of the family home received enthusiastic 
support from Congress, reflecting deeply-held views that private 
homeownership represents a cornerstone of the American 
dream.126 
                                                          
(West 2010).  
122  Id. 
123  See id. § 983(b)(3). 
124  Id.  § 983(b)(2)(B)(i). 
125  The adverse impact and severe consequences upon an entire family 
caused by the forfeiting of a primary residence was clearly on the minds of key 
senators as compromises were reached leading to this provision. For example, 
Senator Leahy noted that Vermont state law does not permit the forfeiture of 
real property that is used as the primary residence of a person involved in the 
violation and a member or members of that person’s family. See 146 CONG. 
REC. 3655 (2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (citing 18 V.S.A. § 4241(a)(5)).   
126  See Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal 
Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (2009) (describing 
theoretical notions of the home’s reign over property law and its connection to 
one’s personhood). See also JIM CULLEN, THE AMERICAN DREAM 136 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2003) (noting that no American dream has broader appeal than that 
of owning a home). The premium placed on protecting the family home from a 
wrongful taking may also been seen in current efforts to provide counsel for 
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CAFRA expands access to counsel in three important ways.127 
First, it authorizes federal courts to appoint counsel for indigent 
property owners who are accused of a crime related to the subject 
of the civil forfeiture proceeding and are represented by court-
appointed counsel in the underlying criminal case. In these 
instances, a court is encouraged, though not required, to appoint 
counsel for a property owner where the individual has standing to 
contest the civil forfeiture and asserts a claim in good faith. 
Lawyers who are appointed to provide representation are 
compensated at levels authorized by the Criminal Justice Act for 
court-appointed counsel in criminal proceedings.128  
Second, upon request of an indigent property owner, the act 
requires a court to appoint counsel where a primary residence is 
the subject of civil forfeiture proceedings.129 In these instances, the 
court appoints the Legal Services Corporation and, again, the 
lawyer’s services are compensated at rates equivalent to that set for 
court-appointed counsel under the Criminal Justice Act.130   
Finally, CAFRA provides a financial incentive to expand 
access to legal representation by authorizing an award of attorney’s 
fees to a property owner who substantially prevails against the 
                                                          
homeowners in foreclosure proceedings. See, e.g., supra note 80. 
127  In addition to expanding access to counsel, CAFRA eliminated cost 
bonds which, until their removal, presented onerous obstacles to challenging 
government seizures of private property. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 19 
U.S.C.A. § 1608 (West 2010).  
128  18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(1)(A) provides that: 
if a person with standing to contest the forfeiture of property in a 
judicial civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil forfeiture statute is 
financially unable to obtain representation by counsel, and the person is 
represented by counsel appointed under section 3006A of this title in 
connection with a related criminal case, the court may authorize 
counsel to represent that person with respect to the claim. 
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(b)(1)(A) (West 2010). 18 
U.S.C. § 983(b)(1)(B) instructs trial courts to take into account “the person’s 
standing to contest the forfeiture,” and “whether the claim appears to be made in 
good faith” when determining whether to authorize an appointment of counsel. 
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(b)(1)(B) (West 2010). 
129  Id. § 983(b)(2)(A). 
130  Id. § 983(b)(2)(A)–(B). 
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United States in a civil forfeiture proceeding. While the Equal 
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) had already authorized attorney’s 
fees against the U.S. government under limited circumstances, 
CAFRA’s grant of authority to a claimant who substantially 
prevails in civil forfeiture litigation (and is not convicted of a 
crime related to the subject property) expands the potential for 
recovery of attorney’s fees against the federal government.131 
IV. FIVE LESSONS LEARNED FROM CAFRA’S STATUTORY RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL 
The successful legislative effort to expand access to counsel for 
property owners in federal civil forfeiture proceedings holds 
valuable lessons for the civil Gideon movement. The movement to 
establish a right to counsel proceeded simultaneously in both 
judicial and legislative forums, but advocates soon found that 
judicial efforts largely failed while legislative initiatives offered 
greater promise of success. The balance of this Article identifies 
and discusses five important lessons that may be drawn from this 
successful reform effort, with special focus on CAFRA’s 
achievement of a right to counsel for indigent homeowners whose 
primary residences are the subject of federal civil forfeiture 
proceedings. Hopefully, these lessons offer helpful guidance to 
advocates fighting to secure a right to counsel at the public 
expense for indigent litigants in a broad range of civil proceedings.  
A. Lesson One: Narrative stories of failure which document 
how lives are shattered and private property seized from 
ordinary citizens in civil proceedings, without the 
safeguard of having a lawyer present, provide a 
powerful catalyst for legislative change.   
A powerful catalyst for legislative change is often rooted in 
compelling narrative stories recounted by ordinary citizens 
describing incidents of abuse, injustice, and official overreaching. 
                                                          
131  See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, 
114 Stat. 202, § 4 (2000). 
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“Narratives make a point and persuade people because of the 
lifelikeness, which is in turn based on a person’s knowledge about 
how things really happen in the world . . . .” (internal quotations 
omitted).132 Lawyers have long relied upon storytelling as a 
valuable advocacy tool because they recognize that emotion 
persuades.133 For this reason, storytelling is routinely used at trial 
in appeals to juries and also in negotiations,134 and it is 
strategically used in legal advocacy and brief writing addressed to 
the highest courts.135   
Storytelling is especially effective when it depicts characters 
that draw listeners into a narrative that facilitates empathy and 
understanding.136 It is widely acknowledged that “[s]tories, 
parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful means for 
destroying mindset—the bundle of presuppositions, received 
wisdoms, and shared understandings against a background of 
which legal and political discourse takes place.”137 As a result, 
legal narrative is increasingly taught in law schools in appreciation 
                                                          
132 Bret Rappaport, Tapping the Human Adaptive Origins of Storytelling by 
Requiring Legal Writing Students to Read a Novel in Order to Appreciate How 
Character, Setting, Plot, Theme, and Tone (CSPTT) are as Important as IRAC, 
25 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 267, 273–74 (2008). 
133  Id. at 276. 
134 See Stacey Caplow, Putting the “I” in Wr*t*ng: Drafting an A/Effective 
Personal Statement to Tell a Winning Refugee Story, 14 LEGAL WRITING: J. 
LEGAL WRITING INST. 249, 261 n.41, 42 (2008). 
135 While trial instruction materials routinely tout the power of storytelling 
in convincing a trial judge or jury of the wisdom of the lawyer’s legal position, 
narrative persuasion is actually used effectively throughout all lawyering and 
even in more formal and legalistic means of advocacy, such as appellate briefs 
and oral argument before the highest courts. See, e.g., Richard K,. Sherwin, The 
Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 709–16 (1994) 
(discussing storytelling that was used by advocates in their brief in Miranda v. 
Arizona to convince the high Court that the interrogation process was unfair). 
See also Philip N. Meyer, Are the Characters in a Death Penalty Brief Like the 
Characters in a Movie?, 32 VT. L. REV. 877 n.4 (2008) (citing Anthony G. 
Amsterdam’s list of limits in using narrative persuasion in cost-conviction 
litigation).  
136  Meyer, supra note 135, at 1.  
137  Richard Delgado, Legal Storytelling: Storytelling for Oppositionists 
and Others: A Plea for the Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2413 (1989). 
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of the notion that storytelling affects what we come to regard as 
truth and reality, and serves as an effective means of motivating us 
to adopt a proposed remedy to a legal problem.138 At its core, 
narrative stories are “enabling and empowering and, indeed, 
fundamental to how we fashion our beliefs and how we act upon 
them.”139 In short, narratives are an important and effective 
component of advocacy in all of its forms. 
Storytelling has long been at the heart of successful legislative 
initiatives. Narrative stories resonate deeply with the public (and 
their elected officials) when the lives of ordinary people are 
seriously injured by governmental action which violates widely 
held notions of fairness. Storytelling can establish and perpetuate a 
particular view of reality,140 and listening to narrative stories 
allows one to see the world through another’s eyes.141 Proponents 
of civil asset forfeiture reform understood this basic tool and used 
it effectively in their efforts to achieve systemic change.   
The highly rated television news show 60 Minutes is a national 
forum for effective storytelling that has often prompted legislative 
action. In 1992, the show featured the story of Willie Jones, an 
African-American landscaper who was stopped at the Nashville 
airport after paying cash for his airline ticket.142 While detained at 
                                                          
138  See Rhonda V. Magee, Symposium: Deconstructing Race: When 
Reasonable Minds Differ Toward an Integral Critical Approach to Thinking, 
Talking, Writing, and Teaching About Race, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 259 (2008); 
James R. Elkins, Popular Culture, Legal Films, and Legal Film Critics, 40 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 745, 758 (2007). See also Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative 
Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 686–867 (1994). 
139  Philip N. Meyer, Teaching Writing and Teaching Doctrine: A 
Symbiotic Relationship? Vignettes from a Narrative Primer, 12 LEGAL 
WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 229, 230 (2006) (discussing why it is 
important to teach narrative persuasion and providing a brief summary of 
references to scholarship on legal storytelling and narrative jurisprudence).   
140  See Delgado, supra note 137, at 2422. See also Bendavid, supra note 
91, at 1. 
141  Delgado, supra note 137, at 2439. 
142  See 60 Minutes: You’re Under Arrest (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 
5, 1992). See also Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 270–271 (1996) (statement 
of Mark Kappelhoff, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).    
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the ticket counter, Mr. Jones was told that no one had ever paid 
cash for a ticket.143 Following detention, law enforcement 
authorities seized $9,000 in cash from his person because, 
according to police, he matched the profile of a drug courier.144 
Although Mr. Jones explained that he was carrying this sum of 
cash to buy landscaping materials for his business from a nursery 
in Texas that required payment by cash, law enforcement 
authorizes were unpersuaded. In testimony before the House 
Judiciary Committee, Mr. Jones described what happened to him 
after being stopped by police at the airport:  
I was questioned about had I ever been involved in any 
drug-related activity, and I told them, no, I had not. So they 
told me I might as well tell the truth because they were 
going to find out anyway. So they ran it through on the 
computer after I presented my driver’s license to them, 
which everything was—I had—it was all in my name. And 
he ran it through the computer, and one officer told the 
other one, saying, he is clean. But instead, they said that the 
dogs hit on the money. So they told me at that time they 
was going to confiscate the money.145   
The agents contended that police dogs had identified traces of 
drugs on the money, justifying the seizure of Jones’ cash. Mr. 
Jones was then released by the agents and never charged with a 
criminal offense. He was told that he could continue on to Texas if 
he wanted since his plane had not yet departed. Of course, as noted 
by Representative Henry Hyde in a legislative hearing, Mr. Jones 
had no reason to continue on to Texas since his money was gone 
and he could not buy the shrubs that his cash was intended to 
purchase.146 
Federal civil forfeiture law required Mr. Jones to post a 10 
percent cost bond in order to legally challenge the seizure of his 
property. However, he was unable to afford this cost.147  He later 
                                                          
143  H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 6 (1999). 
144  Id. See also 60 Minutes, supra note 142.  
145  H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 6–7. 
146  Id. at 7.   
147  Id. 
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filed a civil action in federal court alleging that he was the victim 
of an unconstitutional search and seizure.148 The court agreed, and 
his cash was ultimately returned to him. In ruling for Mr. Jones, a 
federal judge sounded a strong note of concern, stating “that the 
statutory [forfeiture] scheme as well as its administrative 
implementation provide[d] substantial opportunity for abuse and 
potentiality for corruption.”149   
The Willie Jones story highlighted the burdensome obstacles 
that ordinary citizens faced in challenging the government’s 
seizure of their property. In addition, it raised serious issues of 
governmental overreaching seemingly authorized by civil 
forfeiture law. In Mr. Jones’ case, inadequate legal protections also 
raised troubling questions as to whether civil forfeiture law was 
contributing to racial profiling by law enforcement authorities.150 
While the court did not find sufficient evidence of racial 
motivation in the Jones’ case, race has played a part in other drug 
seizure investigations.151 
Congress heard compelling stories in legislative hearings from 
many victims of civil forfeiture law. In Vermont, civil forfeiture 
practices garnered considerable legislative and media attention 
when the parents of a local Vermont family were accused and 
convicted of federal drug violations. The Mannings and their four 
children lived on a farm owned by the parents. The federal 
government brought an action to forfeit the family home based 
upon the alleged illegal acts of the parents. If the action proved 
successful, a forfeiture would have deprived the innocent children 
of their family home. Senator Jeffords, among others, interceded 
and convinced the U.S. attorney to accept a beneficial trust for the 
children that would allow them to continue to live on the farm even 
if the property was confiscated in the forfeiture action.   
The Manning children were fortunate to have influential 
elected officials to speak on their behalf. Many others, however, 
are not so fortunate, especially when they lack the financial means 
                                                          
148  Jones v. United States Drug Enforcement Admin., 819 F. Supp. 698, 
724 (M.D. Tenn. 1993). 
149  Id. 
150  See H. R. REP. NO. 105-358, pt. 1, at 23–26.   
151  Jones, 819 F. Supp. at 723. 
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to hire an attorney to protect their interests. The experience of a 
constituent family compelled Vermont’s Senator James Jeffords to 
introduce a civil asset forfeiture reform act152 designed to prevent 
the “devastating psychological impact that the confiscation of 
homes can have on the innocent children who live in them.”153 
Senator Jeffords noted that too often property is seized from 
individuals who are never charged with or convicted of a crime. He 
expressed special concern for individuals who face difficult 
burdens when the government’s actions take the form of a civil 
proceeding which lacks the protections inherent in a criminal 
case.154 Senator Jeffords recognized that property owners need the 
assistance of counsel under these circumstances and he therefore 
sponsored a provision in CAFRA which authorized the 
appointment of counsel for a person who is financially unable to 
obtain representation. Under this proposal, an appointed lawyer 
would be compensated in an amount equal to that provided to 
appointed counsel in criminal proceedings.155   
The adage attributed to former House Speaker Tip O’Neal that 
all politics is local156 proved true in Vermont and played an 
                                                          
152  Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, S. 1655, 103rd Cong. (1993), was 
introduced by Senator Jeffords of Vermont in the Senate in 1993. See S. 1655: 
Civil Asset Reform Act, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bill.xpd?bill=s103-1655 (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). After being referred to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee and then to the Subcommittee on Courts and 
Administrative Practice the bill was never reported out of committee. See 
Committee Assignments, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill. 
xpd?bill=s103-1655&tab=committees (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). 
153  139 CONG. REC. S1,655 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993) (statement of Sen. 
James Jeffords), 139 CONG. REC. S 15601, at *S1,655 (LEXIS). 
154  Senator Jeffords noted that “as much as 80 percent of the people whose 
property is seized are never charged with, let alone convicted of, a crime.” Id. 
155  Sec. 608(b)(1) and (2) of the Senate bill provided for compensation to 
be funded by the Justice Department’s Assets Forfeiture Fund established under 
section 524 of title 28, United States Code, and compensated at rates in 
accordance with section 3006A of title 18, United States Code, with maximum 
compensation at $3500 per attorney for representation at the district court level 
and $2500 per attorney for appellate court representation, similar to maximums 
set in federal felony cases. Id.  
156  THOMAS P. “TIP” O’NEILL, JR. WITH WILLIAM NOVAK, MAN OF THE 
HOUSE 26 (1987).   
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important role in the introduction of legislation intended to remedy 
abuses of governmental authority back home.157 Senator Patrick 
Leahy of Vermont put it this way: 
I am well aware from incidents in Vermont about how 
aggressive use by Federal and State law enforcement 
officials of civil asset forfeiture laws can appear unfair and 
excessive, and thereby fuel public distrust of the 
government in general and law enforcement in particular.158 
Compelling stories that prompt legislative action often come 
from the experiences of ordinary families in an elected official’s 
home district. According to House Judiciary Committee testimony, 
Margaret L. Cutkomp was seventy-five years old and a hard-
working, frugal woman who chose to save rather than spend her 
savings.159 She never took a vacation or missed a day’s work in the 
business.160 By age seventy, Margaret Cutkomp had acquired 
ownership of a couple of residential rental properties and had 
saved a total of around $70,000 which she kept in a floor safe 
located in her house.161 She was a holdover from the Great 
Depression and grew up distrusting banks.162   
In December 1989, federal law enforcement authorities seized 
Margaret Cutkomp’s cash savings and three months later her home 
and two rental properties which she owned.163 The government 
never charged Margaret Cutkomp with a crime.164 Apparently, her 
                                                          
157  See Albert Hunt, Rep. O’Neill, House Democrats’ Choice, Looms as 
Powerful and Assertive Speaker, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1976. 
158  146 CONG. REC. 3,655 (2000) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).  
159  Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 21 (1996) (statement of King Cutkomp). 
See USA v. Three Parcels of Real Estate, et al., Property Claimant Margaret L. 
Cutkomp, Civil Action No. 89-4131 (dismissing forfeiture action by reason of 
settlement entered on Dec. 13, 1990 (pleading no. 52), with stipulated final 
judgment of forfeiture filed Jan. 4, 1991 (pleading no. 53)) for additional 
information. 
160  Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 21 (1996) (statement of King Cutkomp). 
161  Id. 
162  Id. 
163  Id. 
164  Id. 
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only wrongful act was living next door to one of her adult sons, 
who purportedly sold marijuana from his home. In legislative 
testimony, Margaret Cutkomp’s other son, King Cutkomp, 
described how his mother’s safe was rusted shut and had to be 
drilled open, a fact very much at odds with the government’s 
theory that the cash stored in her home was the product of the 
alleged illegal activity.165 Indeed, the bills in the safe were mostly 
old bills from the 1960s and 1970s that showed their age by being 
covered in mold and mildew.166   
Nonetheless, Margaret Cutkomp was told by government 
authorities that she had one-half hour to pack up and get out of her 
house.167 While an attorney called by King Cutkomp was able to 
stop his mother’s eviction from her home, King Cutkomp 
ultimately determined that it would cost more to go to trial and 
fight the government than his mother’s seized property was 
actually worth.168 A settlement with the government allowed 
Margaret Cutkomp to keep some of her life-long savings but, 
according to King Cutkomp’s testimony, the government took 
most of it and along with it his mother’s “dignity and love for our 
government.”169 King ultimately joined reform efforts and urged 
Congress to re-write civil forfeiture laws to include “proof, fairness 
and compassion.”170 He testified that civil forfeiture law was 
“ruining people’s lives” and he called it “a national disgrace.”171 
Proponents of forfeiture reform recognized that legal 
arguments and appeals to noble principles alone would not bring 
about needed legislative change. They understood that they needed 
to show in plain terms how civil forfeiture practices victimized 
ordinary citizens, offended basic principles of fairness, and seized 
cherished belongings often without any lawyer to help a property 
owner. Legislative success depended on being able to bring these 
tragic stories to light, especially as they affected ordinary citizens 
                                                          
165  See id. at 22. 
166  Id. 
167  Id. 
168  Id. at 22–23. 
169  Id. at 23.  
170  Id. at 24. 
171  Id. 
RULLI - FINAL.DOC 5/9/2011  4:04 PM 
722 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
who were absolutely innocent of any wrongdoing. As the call for 
forfeiture reform drew increasing support, Senator Leahy 
proclaimed that it was “time for Congress to catch up with the 
American people and the courts and do the right thing on this 
important issue of fairness.”172  
 To remedy forfeiture abuse, Congress understood that it 
needed to address the fact that so many property owners did not 
have counsel and often surrendered their private property rather 
than oppose the government. As a result, access to counsel became 
one of the key reforms in overhauling the nation’s civil forfeiture 
laws. Congress appeared particularly disturbed by the fact that 
individuals accused of crimes had greater access to counsel than 
law-abiding property owners who were not charged with any 
criminal wrongdoing.173 To restore fairness to forfeiture law, 
reform legislation needed to increase access to counsel.174 
In recent years, advocates seeking greater funding for civil 
legal aid and promoting higher levels of pro bono participation 
from the private bar have generally appealed to higher callings of 
the legal profession and to noble objectives of due process of law. 
Quite understandably, the access to justice movement has touted 
stories of success which lawyers for the poor have achieved when 
they represent indigent clients. These stories are generally 
uplifting: they describe a home saved, a public benefit obtained, or 
personal safety restored. The stories document happy endings in 
courts and governmental agencies, made possible because the poor 
had a trained advocate at their side. The stories are frequently 
recounted in bar association magazines or legal newspapers, with 
the goal of boosting lawyer volunteerism and promoting increased 
funding from public and private sources. In short, success stories 
make lawyers feel good and help to secure needed participation 
                                                          
172  146 CONG. REC. S1762 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. 
Patrick Leahy).  
173  Oversight of Federal Asset Forfeiture: Its Role in Fighting Crime: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 85 (1999) (Samuel Buffone, Co-Chair of the 
Forfeiture Abuse Task Force, National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers).   
174  See 145 CONG. REC. 14,116 (1999) (Statement of Rep. Deborah Pryce). 
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and support from the bar and judiciary.   
However, feel good stories are not likely to be the stories that 
will ultimately mold public opinion on the need for a lawyer at the 
public expense in a civil case. Civil forfeiture reform teaches us 
that the narrative stories which are more likely to have a strong 
impact on public opinion and elected officials are those that 
describe tragic consequences that befall ordinary families when 
they do not have a lawyer to protect their most precious interests. 
Rather than success stories, these are stories of failure. These are 
the stories of what happens to families, low-income and middle-
income, who lose their homes; elderly citizens who are denied 
critical medical care when they need it most; and parents who lose 
custody of their children not because the facts or the law are 
against them, but rather because they simply do not have a lawyer 
to give them a shot at a fair hearing in our civil justice system. 
These are the stories in which justice is meted out not based upon a 
proper application of the law, but instead based upon harsh 
realities of default in which status and wealth are deciding factors. 
These are the stories that must be told in public forums, on 
television, in social media, in general circulation newspapers, and 
ultimately in the halls of Congress.   
The first lesson of civil forfeiture reform is that for legislative 
change to occur, the public and their elected officials must be 
confronted with the tragic stories of ordinary lives shattered in our 
civil justice system, not based upon what is right or fair, but rather 
because they did not have a lawyer at their side to protect their 
most fundamental interests.   
B. Lesson Two: Strong cautionary statements about inadequate 
legal protections, voiced by influential courts, and 
bolstered by academic and popular criticism and 
supporting empirical data, provide a firm foundation for 
civil justice reforms.   
The narrative stories of citizens victimized by civil forfeiture 
abuse painted a powerful picture of the problem, but might not 
have resulted in legislative change without the official imprimatur 
of influential courts and the detailed writings of academics 
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describing how civil forfeiture procedures were failing ordinary 
citizens. In other words, forfeiture reform hinged not only on the 
telling of narrative stories; these experiences needed to be 
validated by credible and respected institutions wielding power in 
our society.  
In civil forfeiture reform, official validation of legal 
deficiencies and systemic unfairness took many forms. Strong 
statements appearing in the text of decisions by appellate courts in 
the cases before them provided a powerful and urgent message 
from conservative institutions of the need for substantial change. 
Under some circumstances, judicially-crafted language appearing 
in court decisions can motivate and influence the expectations of 
social actors. Unquestionably, court victories affect legal discourse 
and embolden action, while enhancing negotiation postures and 
mobilizing social movements.175 Legal action has often been the 
catalyst for change needed to remedy social injustice.176 Lawyers 
are often good social change agents because of their “[l]eadership 
qualities, forensic ability, talent for reasoning, and knowledge of 
the legal system,” all of which aid in generating change and 
nourishing social movements to succeed.177   
In civil forfeiture cases before them, federal judges expressed 
deep concern that the legal framework did not adequately protect 
the legitimate interests of property owners.178 For example, in 
United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., the 
Second Circuit stated, “We continue to be enormously troubled by 
the government’s increasing and virtually unchecked use of the 
                                                          
175  See Shannon Roesler, Permutations of Judicial Power: The New 
Constitutionalism and the Expansion of Judicial Authority, 32 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 545, 571–74 (2007). 
176  See Hannah Gordon, The Robinson Rule: Models for Addressing Race 
Discrimination in the Hiring of NCAA Head Football Coaches, 15 SPORTS LAW. 
J. 1, *8 n.33 (2008).  
177  See James E. Moliterno, The Lawyer as Catalyst of Social Change, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1568 (2009). 
178  See generally United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998). See 
also Oversight of Federal Asset Forfeiture: Its Role in Fighting Crime: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 91 (1999) (statement of Roger Pilon, Vice President for 
Legal Affairs, Cato Institute).      
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civil forfeiture statutes and the disregard for due process that is 
buried in those statutes.”179 Federal judges voiced their concerns, 
and Congress listened.180 
Critical discussion of the harshness of civil forfeiture law also 
took hold in academic journals, popular books, special interest 
campaigns, and investigative articles published by general 
newspapers. Representative Henry Hyde forcefully advanced the 
need for change in his book Forfeiting Our Property Rights, in 
which he directly questioned whether private property was safe 
from seizure. He voiced concern about the violation of 
constitutional protections and the extent to which cherished 
liberties were lost in civil forfeiture cases. Summarizing his 
reasons for writing a book on this topic, Representative Hyde 
stated, “My personal belief, which prompted my writing this book, 
is that there is an immediate need for restoration of the 
constitutional principles that are debased by the current application 
of asset forfeiture laws.”181 Representative Hyde was not alone. 
Leonard A. Levy, a constitutional scholar, wrote A License to Steal 
in which he documented forfeiture abuses and expressed views that 
were highly critical of civil forfeiture practices.182 
The American Civil Liberties Union ran a media campaign 
exposing the dangers of civil forfeiture and took out a full-page 
advertisement in a Sunday New York Times Magazine condemning 
civil forfeiture practices.183 General circulation newspapers 
                                                          
179  United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 
905 (2d Cir. 1992). 
180  See generally 146 CONG. REC. 3655 (2000) (statement of Sen. Patrick 
Leahy). Frequent references during the legislative process to critical language 
appearing in court opinions about civil forfeiture practices showed that Congress 
heard and valued the concerns of appellate courts on this subject. See id.    
181  HYDE, supra note 94, at 4.  
182  See LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF 
PROPERTY (1996).  
183  See Advertisement, American Civil Liberties Union, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
April 29, 2001, at 135 (containing a picture of Uncle Sam pointing a gun at the 
reader with the statement below “I want your Money, Jewelry, Car, Boat and 
House.” The advertisement continued, “The forfeiture laws were designed as a 
new government weapon in the ‘war on drugs.’ But they’ve done little more 
than provide law enforcement with a license to steal.”).  See also Latest ACLU 
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devoted substantial investigative resources to exposing the ills of 
civil forfeiture practices. The Pittsburgh Press published a six-day 
series reflecting ten months of national research on civil asset 
forfeiture in which reporters reviewed 25,000 drug seizures; 
interviewed 1,600 prosecutors, defense lawyers, cops, federal 
agents, and victims, and looked at court documents in 510 cases. 
The multi-part series concluded that “seizure and forfeiture, the 
legal weapons meant to eradicate the enemy, have done enormous 
collateral damage to the innocent.”184   
These varied writings were bolstered by empirical data which 
had a profound impact upon elected officials. Legislators routinely 
consider policy issues that are informed by empirical research.185 
Empirical data plays an important part in justifying the need for 
reform, especially when it involves research methods that extend 
beyond quantitative data and include research based upon 
observation and experience.186 Empirical research is frequently 
used as a basis for amending statutes in the legislative process,187 
and while it does not necessarily provide answers to policy 
questions, it does raise the level of policy debate and can improve 
its conclusions.188 If legislators are to make factual assumptions in 
legislation they sponsor or support, it is important that those 
assumptions be grounded in fact and empirical data can help to 
provide them with a better understanding of how laws play out in 
                                                          
Advertisement Targets Asset Forfeiture Laws, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION (April 27, 2001), http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice_prisoners-rights_ 
drug-law-reform_immigrants-rights/latest-aclu-advertisement-targets. 
184  Andrew Schneider & Mary Pat Flaherty, Presumed Guilty, The Law’s 
Victims in the War on Drugs, THE PITTSBURGH PRESS, Aug. 11, 1991, 
http://www.drugtext.org/library/specials/presumedguilty/index.html. 
185  See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, The Nebraska Death Penalty Study: An 
Interdisciplinary Symposium, Evaluating Empirical Research Methods: Using 
Empirical Research in Law and Policy, 81 NEB. L. REV. 777, 778 (2002). 
186  See generally Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
187  Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The 
Use of Empirical Data in Formulating Bankruptcy Policy, 50 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 195, 196 (1987). 
188  Id. at 197.   
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the real world.189   
Social science research is critical not just to the legislative 
process, but also to judicial decision making. It occupies a valuable 
role in the way that courts consider how information about social 
reality contributes to shaping the way society should be ordered,190 
and in how many leading legal questions should be resolved, such 
as the size of a jury in a criminal case,191 the application of Rule 11 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,192 or capital punishment 
decision making.193 Many agree that better information through 
social science data improves public policymaking.194 Certainly, 
policy wonks urged Congress to base the nation’s drug policy on 
                                                          
189  See Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L. J. 1435, 1448 
(2007) (discussing the role of empirical data and social science research upon 
judicial decision making and the formulation of legal rules).  
190  See, e.g., Wallace D. Loh, In Quest of Brown’s Promise: Social 
Research and Social Values in School Desegregation, 58 WASH. L. REV. 129, 
163–64 (1982). 
191  See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231–39 (1978) (declaring 
unconstitutional a five-member jury in a criminal case and describing empirical 
data supporting the holding). 
192  See Carl Tobias, Some Realism About Empiricism, 26 CONN. L. REV. 
1093, 1098 (1994) (discussing the important role that empirical data on Rule 
11’s application and use played in the work of public policymakers, such as the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, in formulating proposed amendments to 
the Rule). 
193  See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, The Nebraska Death Penalty Study: An 
Interdisciplinary Symposium, Evaluating Empirical Research Methods: Using 
Empirical Research in Law and Policy, 81 NEB. L. REV. 777, 777 (2002) 
(highlighting the extensive study of capital punishment decision making in 
Nebraska conducted by David Baldus and colleagues). 
194  See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 192, at 1103.  There is, of course, 
considerable debate about the role that social science should play in the decision 
making of legal institutions. There is understandable tension between social 
science methodology, which “seeks quantifiable precision” in its measurements 
and attempts to statistically control for the effects of multiple variables, and the 
work of legal institutions that operate in “complex circumstances influenced by 
an indefinite variety of known and unknown factors.” See also Robert F. 
Schopp, The Nebraska Death Penalty Study: An Interdisciplinary Symposium, 
81 NEB. L. REV. 479, 483 (2002). This debate is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
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science and research, not ideology.195 
While empirical studies are essential, their effectiveness can be 
undermined if the data is too voluminous, complex, or 
indecipherable to be really helpful to decision-makers. In the 
legislative process, a simple statistic that captures the essence of 
the problem as it affects real people can serve effectively as a 
rallying call for change. In the movement to obtain civil forfeiture 
reform, one such statistic emerged as an effective rallying cry: At 
least 80 percent of all civil forfeiture cases go unchallenged, 
without benefit of counsel.196 Over and over again, this statistic 
reminded legislators of the inescapable fact that the uphill 
challenge of litigating civil forfeiture cases and defending private 
property against the government resulted in at least eight out of 
every ten cases going uncontested.197   
Elected officials repeatedly asked law enforcement authorities 
to explain why there was such a high uncontested rate in civil 
forfeiture cases. They wanted to know who were the property 
owners who did not contest forfeiture.198 Were property owners 
walking away from their property as a way of avoiding an 
indictment?199 Or was it just too expensive or difficult to obtain a 
                                                          
195  Pros and Cons of Drug Legalization, Decriminalization, and Harm 
Reduction: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 
and Human Resources of the H. Comm. On Government Reform, 106th Cong. 
181 (1999) (statement of Scott Ehlers, Senior Policy Analyst, Drug Policy 
Foundation).  
196  H.R. REP. NO. 105-358, pt. 1, at 28–29 (1997) (emphasis added).   
197  Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1835 Before the 
Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 148 (1997) (statement of David Smith, 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). See also Oversight of 
Federal Asset Forfeiture: Its Role in Fighting Crime: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
106th Cong. 90 (1999) (statement of Roger Pilon, Vice President for Legal 
Affairs, Cato Institute).    
198  See 145 CONG. REC. H4862 (daily ed. June 24, 1999) (statement of 
Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee), 145 CONG. REC. H 4858, at *H4862 (LEXIS).   
199 Oversight of Federal Asset Forfeiture: Its Role in Fighting Crime: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 90 (1999) (statement of Roger Pilon, Vice 
President for Legal Affairs, Cato Institute).   
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lawyer in order to litigate against the government? This one, 
simple statistic—that 80 percent of all civil forfeiture cases went 
uncontested—spoke powerfully and frequently to the fact that 
something was definitely wrong. Ordinary citizens were stripped 
of their property simply because they lacked access to the courts to 
stand toe-to-toe with the government, which, ironically, is always 
represented by a lawyer in court. The cases were often too 
expensive to litigate in relation to the value of property at stake.200 
For low-income citizens who cannot afford a lawyer under any 
circumstances, they simply had no choice but to walk away even 
when they had meritorious arguments to present.   
At its core, the ability to have a lawyer at one’s side during 
frightening times when confronting superior governmental 
resources is what enables citizens to have access to the courts, a 
promise that is basic to a well-functioning democracy. The truth is 
that access to our courts is linked closely to having a lawyer by 
one’s side,201 and the absence of counsel unquestionably accounted 
for such a high uncontested rate in civil forfeiture cases.202   
The 80 percent uncontested statistic was deeply disturbing to 
lawmakers. It posed a haunting question to which there never 
surfaced an entirely satisfactory answer, other than that there must 
be a serious flaw in the system. The success of our civil justice 
system depends upon ordinary citizens being able to tell their side 
of the story before any official action takes place that deprives 
them of their hard-earned gains. How is it that eight out of every 
ten property owners would simply walk away from their property 
without a fight, an explanation, or a defense?   
If individuals were allowing their property to forfeit to the 
                                                          
200 For example, one civil forfeiture victim, Richard Apfelbaum, was a 
salesman carrying slightly less than ten thousand dollars on his way to Las 
Vegas to gamble when drug enforcement agents stopped him and conducted a 
consensual search. See LEVY, supra note 182, at 131.  Upon finding the money, 
the agents confiscated the money and left him only thirty dollars to return home. 
Id. Initially, Apfelbaum fought back by posting a bond and hiring an attorney, 
but over time with attorneys’ fees mounting, he gave up and was quoted as 
saying “I’m not in a position to spend $10,000 trying to get $9,000 back.” Id. 
201  Kaufman, supra note 53, at 372.   
202  See H.R. REP. NO. 105-358, pt. 1 at 28–29 (1997).   
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government without a fight when they had a legitimate defense 
either because the burdens of the law were set too high or their 
defenses could not be presented without the help of a lawyer, 
confidence in the rule of law was clearly at risk. Eric Holder, then 
a high ranking member of the Justice Department, expressed this 
vital concern when he testified that “no tool of law enforcement, 
however effective at fighting crime, can survive for long if the 
public thinks that it violates the basic principles of fairness and due 
process that lie at the core of the American system of justice.”203  
Congressman Hyde stated that he simply wanted to “give the 
average citizen who is not a sheriff, who does not have a relative in 
city council,” an opportunity at obtaining due process of law.204   
The second lesson of civil forfeiture reform is that narrative 
stories, while powerful, are usually not enough by themselves to 
bring about needed change. Narrative stories gain real strength 
when joined with official validation from high sources and 
respected institutions, such as appellate courts, and when a broad 
range of voices are raised through academic articles, books, and 
investigative reports published in leading newspapers. And, 
significantly, these voices can crystallize behind a powerful, 
simple statistic which suggests that the game as it is playing out in 
the real world is fundamentally unfair. In the civil forfeiture 
context, that statistic was one which presented a haunting question 
that had no obvious answer other than that the system was simply 
unfair. A challenge for the civil Gideon movement will be to find 
an equally powerful statistic that highlights a fundamental flaw in 
the civil justice system when lawyers for the poor are absent.  
This second lesson further illustrates how simultaneous efforts 
to obtain a right to counsel in both judicial and legislative forums 
paid off. While court efforts alone did not succeed, the 
observations and concerns expressed by appellate courts provided 
a powerful impetus for legislative change and focused national 
attention on the need for reform to protect basic rights.  The civil 
                                                          
203  Oversight of Federal Asset Forfeiture: Its Role in Fighting Crime: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 19 (1999) (statement Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y 
Gen., U.S. Department of Justice).   
204  145 CONG. REC. 14,128 (1999) (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).   
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Gideon movement, as well, would benefit from continuing 
validation from appellate courts of the failings of the civil justice 
system when lawyers are not present, and much more can be said 
in books, newspapers, and social media about the unfair 
advantages conferred upon government and well-resourced parties 
in civil cases simply because an individual on the other side is too 
poor to afford a lawyer.  
C. Lesson Three: Civil forfeiture reform attracted bipartisan 
support from a broad coalition of diverse interests that 
made legislative compromise possible and paved the 
way for the adoption of a right to counsel for indigent 
homeowners whose primary residences were at risk.   
With compelling narrative stories from ordinary citizens and 
mounting concern expressed by courts, academics, and the media, 
reform advocates assembled a broad-based coalition of diverse 
interests that made bipartisan support and legislative consensus 
possible. The broad-based support for reform came from across the 
political spectrum and set the stage for reasonable compromise 
when difficult issues threatened to halt legislative progress. The 
depth of support from diverse organizations made the threat of a 
more robust right to counsel appear credible, forcing detractors to 
reach compromise on a more limited right to counsel for indigent 
homeowners facing seizure of their primary residence.  
The civil forfeiture reform movement brought together the full 
range of political and philosophical ideology and presented a 
coalition of organizations that only come together once every ten 
years.205 This broad coalition of groups206 helped to advance 
legislation that struck the “right balance” in making common sense 
and adopting fair and equitable procedures.207 The movement 
attracted diverse support from such groups as the National Rifle 
Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the U.S. 
                                                          
205 145 CONG. REC. 14,119 (1999) (statement of Rep. John Conyers).   
206 146 CONG. REC. 5227 (2000) (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).   
207 146 CONG. REC. 5232–33 (2000) (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson-
Lee).   
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Chamber of Commerce. Like many other successful social 
movements, this reform initiative achieved results through the 
“participation of diversely located subjects whose immediate and 
direct interests might not coincide with those of the group’s 
agenda.”208 As Senator Leahy stated after agreement had been 
reached on the reform package, “[i]t is not often that we see the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ACLU, NRA, National Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers, American Bankers Association, the 
Institute of Justice, Americans for Tax Reform, and the American 
Bar Association joining together on the same side of a legislative 
effort.”209   
The reform movement’s themes of promoting fairness and 
protecting private property owned by innocent citizens resonated 
with both ends of the political spectrum. The fact that innocent 
property owners (those not even charged with an offense) enjoyed 
fewer rights than individuals accused of a crime when it came to 
gaining access to counsel in forfeiture cases was a troubling 
thought.210 By providing an expanding right to counsel, Congress 
was able to address this problem which in turn lessened the 
concern that civil forfeiture practices might be adversely impacting 
racial minorities and encouraging racial profiling practices.211 
Senator Lindsey Graham supported an expanded right to 
counsel in defense of one’s property against the federal 
government. He favored appointing counsel because it guaranteed 
one’s day in court. In his opinion, standing alone was “no place to 
be” when one’s property was seized by the government.212 When 
fighting the government for one’s own property, Senator Graham 
stated that it was only right that Congress provide for counsel.213 
The use of contrasts can be a powerful tool of persuasion. By 
                                                          
208  Purnima Bose, From Agitation to Institutionalization: The Student Anti-
Sweatshop Movement in the New Millennium, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
213, 224 (2008). 
209 146 CONG. REC. 3654 (2000) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).   
210 146 CONG. REC. 5233 (2000) (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee).   
211 Id., 145 CONG. REC. 14119 (1999) (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde, 
referring to study by PITTSBURGH PRESS).  
212 145 CONG. REC. 14,124 (1999) (statement of Rep. Lindsey Graham).  
213 Id. 
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focusing on stark contrasts between a right to counsel at public 
expense for property owners accused of a crime, from those who 
had no similar right simply because they faced no allegations of 
criminal wrongdoing, Congress struck a responsive chord. While a 
court was authorized to appoint counsel for an accused in a civil 
forfeiture case if it found certain statutory factors to be present,214 
innocent owners not accused of criminal wrongdoing appeared to 
enjoy no such protections. As a result, Senator Leahy supported a 
limited right to counsel permitting courts to authorize counsel to 
represent an indigent claimant when the claimant is already 
represented by a court-appointed counsel in connection with a 
related federal criminal case. He found this to be a fair 
compromise, one that eliminated “any appearance that the 
government chose to pursue the forfeiture in a civil proceeding 
rather than as part of the criminal case in order to deprive the 
claimant of his right to counsel.”215 Representative Barney Frank 
shared this view, pointing out that the loss of property in a civil 
proceeding is no less damaging to an individual than if it is lost as 
a result of a criminal conviction.216 
There was disagreement in Congress about how far to extend a 
right to counsel in civil forfeiture cases. Some senators expressed 
the view that the House of Representatives had gone too far in its 
bill when it created a general right to counsel such that it was 
creating legal aid clinics for property owners in civil forfeiture 
cases.217 However, where an indigent homeowner’s primary 
residence was at stake, leading senators recognized that possible 
eviction or even homelessness might result from the forfeiture of 
property.218 As expressed by Senator Leahy, “[w]hen a forfeiture 
                                                          
214 H.R. Rep. No. 105-358, pt. 1, at 29 (1997) (a court could appoint 
counsel if it found three factors identified in 983(d)(A) –(C) of Title 18 to be 
present). 
215  146 CONG. REC. 3656 (2000) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).  
216  145 CONG. REC. 14,127 (1999) (statement of Rep. Barney Frank).  
217 See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, S. 1931, 106th Cong. § 981A(b) 
(1999) which takes a different approach from the House on the issue of 
appointment of counsel. The Senate narrowed the right to counsel to indigent 
homeowner’s whose primary resident was at stake. See infra note 220. 
218  146 CONG. REC. 3,656 (2000) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). 
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action can result in a claimant’s eviction and homelessness, there is 
more at stake than just a property interest, and it is fair and just that 
the claimant be provided with an attorney if he cannot otherwise 
afford one.”219   
This basic concern, shared across the broad coalition of 
supporters of reform, led to compromise that provided for a right to 
counsel at public expense for indigent homeowners whose primary 
residences are the subject of civil forfeiture proceedings.220 The 
new legislation designated the Legal Services Corporation to 
administer this limited right to counsel for indigent homeowners. 
The stage for this compromise was set when the House Judiciary 
Committee included strong overall right to counsel language in the 
House bill. The Senate reached agreement when the Hatch-Leahy 
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act221 was joined with proposed 
language from the Sessions-Schumer bill, culminating in a Hatch-
Leahy-Sessions-Schumer substitute amendment that was passed by 
the Senate on March 27, 2000.222 While the appointment of the 
Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”) for the implementation of this 
important new limited right to counsel was not something 
specifically requested by LSC, bipartisan compromise in the 
Senate emerged as a means of heading off a broader right to 
counsel that might otherwise have applied to all civil forfeiture 
actions.223   
The third lesson of civil forfeiture reform is that broad-based 
                                                          
219  Id. 
220  See 146 CONG. REC. S1753, S1759-60 (2000). The broad coalition of 
support led to an agreement on March 26, 2000, with Hyde, Leahy, Sessions, 
and Schumer coming together. They were influenced by the knowledge that 
Vermont Law, Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 18 § 4241(a)(5), did not permit forfeiture of 
real property occupied as primary residence of a person involved or a member of 
that person’s family. Id.; see also Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 18 § 4241(a)(5) (2009).  
221  Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, S. 1931, 106th Cong. (1999).   
222  See 146 CONG. REC. 3655 (2000) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).  
223  Senator Sessions opposed efforts to have CJA counsel provide 
representation as a matter of right in such cases, concerned that such an 
extension would be “camel’s nose” to a broader right to counsel. Instead, he 
agreed to a compromise offered by Senator Leahy of substituting LSC attorneys 
for CJA attorneys. See DAVID D. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF 
FORFEITURE CASES 11–12 n.14.6 (1999). 
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support from organizations representing the full political and 
ideological spectrum enables a controversial bill to move through 
the legislature, even in the face of powerful opposing interests. 
Moreover, such broad and deep support can set the stage for 
reasonable compromise that allows the legislation to move 
forward. Here, the threat of an unconditional right to counsel in all 
civil forfeiture proceedings was deemed credible because of the 
depth of support from diverse organizations and interests that 
rarely agree. As a result, opposing views were able to reach 
compromise on a more limited right to counsel when it was 
specifically targeted to the most serious need (protecting primary 
residences) of those individuals most in need (indigent 
homeowners).  
The civil Gideon movement has attracted strong support from 
the organized bar and from those organizations directly involved in 
the delivery of civil legal assistance to the poor. But the question 
remains whether the current coalition is broad enough to wield 
sufficient legislative influence that will be needed when legislation 
proposing such a right is challenged by opponents on philosophical 
or cost grounds. At those times, will the movement to establish a 
civil Gideon be said to have the support of diverse interests that 
come together only once every ten years? If the answer is likely 
not, efforts should be undertaken to expand the base of support, 
looking for ways to strike common ground with business, 
governmental, religious, and other interests not always associated 
with efforts to support the delivery of legal services to the poor. 
Civil forfeiture reform demonstrates the value of having this 
support and offers hope that it is indeed possible.   
D. Lesson Four: A proposed right to counsel in civil forfeiture 
proceedings was not viewed as an end in of itself, but 
rather as a means of insuring that other needed civil 
forfeiture reforms, if adopted, would succeed. 
Lawyers readily understand the vital role that they play in 
achieving the goals of their clients and, not surprisingly, therefore 
regard a right to counsel as a noble end in of itself. The current 
right to counsel coalition certainly ties its raison d’etre to achieving 
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this procedural goal, even though more substantive social justice 
interests are likely the primary concerns of this movement. This 
approach makes good sense to members of the legal profession 
whose training and experience strongly inform their perspective. 
But this view threatens to be too limiting and may even be 
counterproductive as the general public does not necessarily place 
such a high premium on procedural protections. The public is more 
likely to demand legislative change when substantive concerns 
violate their notions of justice and fairness and undermine their 
respect for the law. Lawyers are important, for sure, but they play a 
secondary role to substantive interests that are front and center.224   
This suggests that the public may not be inclined to rally 
behind a general right to counsel as an abstract principle of justice, 
however noble it is, but might be willing to demand of their elected 
officials such a right if they see it as necessarily connected to 
achieving an overriding substantive interest. In civil forfeiture 
reform, access to legal assistance was viewed as a necessary 
adjunct to protecting against the wrongful loss of private property 
to the government, especially when the property at risk was the 
family home. Procedure was tied tightly to substance. In other civil 
matters, the public may not fully understand the need for a lawyer. 
For example, the public might initially be unsympathetic to a 
general right to counsel at the public expense in all housing or real 
estate matters, but might be willing to demand such a right if there 
is not widespread confidence that legislation designed to eliminate 
lending practices that threaten homeownership can succeed 
without a lawyer to assist an indigent homebuyer. In other words, 
the creation of limited rights to counsel in other areas of civil law 
might be most viable where the success of important substantive 
reforms hinges upon the inclusion of such a limited right to 
                                                          
224  Lawyers naturally look to the courts first for support of their argument 
that there should be a right to counsel because they expect that judges, as 
lawyers, understand the close relationship between due process of law, 
fundamental fairness, and an adversary system in which both sides are 
represented by counsel. When lawyers turn to the legislature for support, it is not 
as clear that they will receive the same understanding or support about this 
relationship, especially as the percentage of lawyers serving as legislators 
declines across the country. 
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counsel to make sure that important legislative objectives succeed.   
This was the case in civil forfeiture reform. While access to 
counsel was viewed as an important part of the reform package, it 
was not viewed as an end in of itself. Rather, the enactment of 
CAFRA represented the culmination of a decade-long effort to 
enact a broad range of reforms to insure that property was not 
wrongly taken from individuals by the government. As one ACLU 
representative testified, the appointment of counsel for indigents 
was absolutely needed in order to ensure that individuals would be 
able to avail themselves of the other reforms in the bill.225   
This is not to suggest, however, that the public does not place a 
high value on the abstract principle of requiring access to legal 
help in civil matters, especially on behalf of poor or 
unsophisticated individuals who lack the means to battle superior 
governmental resources. But, in the case of civil forfeiture reform, 
legislators understood that representation by counsel was directly 
connected to the overall fairness of the entire adjudicatory 
framework. In other words, no matter how hard legislators tried to 
design fair civil forfeiture procedures, the process might never 
really be fair if a property claimant was forced to represent herself 
against the government.226 Chairman Henry Hyde embraced this 
view when he noted that in a democracy the means can be as 
important as the ends.227 Even a fairer law and simplified 
procedures might not succeed if a property owner had to face it 
alone.228 
                                                          
225  See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before 
the Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 274–275 (1996) (statement of 
Mark Kappelhoff, ACLU). 
226  See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1835 Before 
the Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 135 (1997) (statement of David 
Smith, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers) (“No matter how 
fair the formal civil forfeiture procedures are, the process can never really be fair 
if a claimant is forced to represent herself.”). 
227  See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1835 Before 
the Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2 (1997) (statement of Rep. Henry 
Hyde) (emphasis added).   
228  Oversight of Federal Asset Forfeiture: Its Role in Fighting Crime: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 85 (1999) (statement of Samuel Buffone, Nat’l 
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However, not everyone shared this basic belief. Eric Holder, 
then a deputy attorney general in the Department of Justice, 
testified that the proposed appointment of counsel in civil 
forfeiture proceedings was one of the two most objectionable 
provisions of the House version of the reform bill.229 He expressed 
concern that it was an incentive for abuse and, if adopted, would 
overburden courts with appointment motions. Some executive 
agency representatives also expressed concern that an expansion of 
access to counsel would increase the number of cases on crowded 
federal court dockets and encourage litigation of plainly forfeitable 
property interests.230 Holder argued that the attorney’s fees 
provision in the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) provided 
sufficient protection for property owners. Under that federal law, 
attorney’s fees can be awarded to a prevailing party against the 
government if the government’s position is not substantially 
justified. While the Justice Department supported some aspects of 
forfeiture reform, it did not support the appointment of counsel as a 
matter of right.231 
Law enforcement officers also testified against the proposed 
appointment of counsel in civil forfeiture actions, arguing that the 
appointment of counsel for indigents would divert significant 
assets to the criminal defense bar,232 and only encourage attorneys 
                                                          
Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers).    
229  Oversight of Federal Asset Forfeiture: Its Role in Fighting Crime: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 22 (1999) (statement Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y 
General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (arguing that H.R. 1658 was too broad and that 
the two most objectionable parts were its appointment of counsel provision and 
its proposed change in the standard of proof). 
230  See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before 
the Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 240 (1996) (statement of Jan 
Blanton, Director, Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture, Dep’t of Treasury).  
231 Oversight of Federal Asset Forfeiture: Its Role in Fighting Crime: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 22 (1999) (statement Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y 
General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice).  
232 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 244 (1996) (statement of James 
McMahon, Superintendent, NY State Police, Internat’l Ass’n of Chiefs of 
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to look for court appointments to file frivolous claims.233 One 
South Carolina sheriff called the bill an “entitlement program for 
lawyers,” arguing that the law-abiding citizens should not be 
forced to pay for legal services for wealthy drug dealers and 
criminal syndicates to defend their criminal activities.234 In short, 
some law enforcement representatives and government officials 
opposed a right to counsel on the basis that the potential for abuse 
was too great, there were insufficient safeguards, and federal law 
(EAJA) already provided for fee shifting under limited 
circumstances. 
On the other hand, the American Bar Association strongly 
endorsed civil forfeiture reform, including the provision of counsel 
for indigents, on the basis that civil forfeiture law disregarded 
basic principles of due process.235 The ABA relied upon the 
Second Circuit’s strong language in the U.S. v. All Assets of 
Statewide Auto Parts case, expressing concern about the lack of 
fairness in civil forfeiture proceedings.236 Criminal defense experts 
argued that the appointment of counsel would provide a legally 
trained champion to get seized property back into the hands of the 
lawful owner, representing the first step toward achieving 
fundamental due process.237   
                                                          
Police). 
233  Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1835 Before the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 120 (1997) (statement of Stefan Cassella, 
Assistant Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice).   
234  Oversight of Federal Asset Forfeiture: Its Role in Fighting Crime: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 71 (1999) (statement of Sheriff Johnny Mack 
Brown).  
235  See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before 
the Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.  260 (1996) (statement of Terrence 
Reed, Am. Bar Ass’n). Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 
1835 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 134 (1997) (statement of 
David Smith, Nat’l Ass’n Criminal Defense Lawyers).     
236  Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 258 (1996) (statement of Terrence Reed, 
Am. Bar Ass’n).   
237  Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1835 Before the 
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Although he objected to an expanded right to counsel, Stefan 
Casella, a justice department official responsible for civil 
forfeitures, conceded that it was more important than ever that 
forfeiture laws operated fairly, that citizens enjoy access to the 
courts, and that property interests of innocent owners be fully 
protected.238 Describing the historical context for the nation’s use 
of civil forfeiture powers, Casella testified that federal forfeiture 
laws were used primarily in the past to forfeit items that had no 
legitimate basis, such as pirate ships, contraband goods, and 
whiskey stills. The war on drugs, however, had expanded the use 
of federal forfeiture laws to people’s primary possessions, 
including their homes, cars, and cash. The application of forfeiture 
laws to legitimate items of fundamental importance to citizens 
raised the stakes, according to Casella, and with it the need to 
ensure fundamental fairness.   
With powerful interests on both sides of this question, a limited 
right to counsel emerged as the means to make civil forfeiture 
procedures fairer for ordinary citizens and to attack the high 
incidence of uncontested actions. With only a limited right to 
counsel to fund, Congress easily identified a ready source of 
funding in the proceeds of forfeited property. Property forfeited to 
the government had proven profitable and the civil asset forfeiture 
fund netted millions of dollars for law enforcement budgets and 
special drug fighting initiatives. These funds could accommodate 
relatively modest expenditures for counsel fees to assure that the 
operation of the forfeiture program was fundamentally fair and that 
real property belonging to indigent homeowners was protected 
from erroneous deprivation.   
Of course, cost remains a huge concern when discussing the 
enactment of a right to counsel. Thus far, attempts to place a dollar 
figure on a right to counsel in civil matters are extremely 
                                                          
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 135 (1997) (statement of David Smith, 
Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers).   
238  Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1916 Before the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 220-21 (1996) (statement of Stefan 
Cassella, Assistant Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice). 
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speculative.239 Especially in difficult economic times, this is not an 
easy issue to tackle. This is why it is so important to quantify 
through statistically reliable studies the savings that can be 
achieved by providing counsel. Some studies suggest that spending 
public dollars on civil legal services can save the public triple or 
quadruple the amount that would need to be spent later if counsel 
is not provided.240 One recent Texas study found that every dollar 
spent in the state for indigent civil legal services generated an 
additional $7.14 in total spending, $3.56 in output, and $2.20 in 
personal income.241  This resulted in an additional $457.6 million 
in business spending and the creation of 3,171 jobs.242 However, 
there are still relatively few economic studies of this kind and there 
are difficulties in measuring precisely such financial gains. 
Alternatively where, as here, a particular subject area of the law 
provides a readily-tapped fund, such as the federal civil asset 
forfeiture fund, the financial cost question is a much easier one to 
answer. 
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, powerful interests are 
likely to disagree about the wisdom, desirability, or affordability of 
a civil right to counsel. This is why it may be helpful to reframe 
the basic question. The fourth lesson of civil forfeiture reform is 
that a civil right to counsel may be more widely acceptable if it is 
viewed not as the primary objective, but rather as the means by 
which to ensure the success of other important legislative goals. 
The prospects of establishing a right to counsel might also be 
improved by limiting that right to cases involving the most serious 
                                                          
239  Kaufman, supra note 53, at 384–85 (suggesting that even an estimate of 
five to nine billion dollars per year may be inadequate, based upon a calculation 
of fifty to ninety million eligible clients each year, spending an average of $100 
per client). 
240  See Bernice K. Leber, The Time for Civil Gideon is Now, 25 TOURO L. 
REV. 23, 26 (2009) (citing a New York City Department of Social Services 
report that finds that for every dollar spent on indigent representation in eviction 
proceedings, four dollars in costs related to homelessness are saved). 
241 THE PERRYMAN GROUP, THE IMPACT OF LEGAL AID SERVICES ON 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN TEXAS: AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT EFFORTS AND 
EXPANSION POTENTIAL (2009), http://www.texasatj.org/files/file/Perryman 
%20Report.pdf. 
242 Id. at 3. 
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needs, at least initially. In a legislative forum, the focus should be 
on the substantive objectives of housing the poor, nourishing 
young children, or protecting the elderly. A right to counsel should 
not be the banner headline, but rather the means to making these 
laudable goals possible. 
E. Lesson Five: The adoption of a limited right to counsel at 
public expense in civil forfeiture cases serves as further 
proof that Congress values the essential role that 
lawyers play in achieving important legislative goals 
and that providing lawyers makes a significant 
difference in case outcomes.   
In Gideon, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the right to 
be heard would in many cases be of little avail if it did not include 
the right to be heard by counsel. Certainly, this turned out to be 
true in the retrial of Clarence Gideon’s criminal case. After the 
Supreme Court’s ruling, Gideon was retried by Florida authorities, 
but this time the trial court appointed an experienced lawyer to 
represent him.243 By some accounts, Gideon’s appointed lawyer 
skillfully picked apart suspect eyewitness testimony on cross-
examination, suggesting in the process that the eyewitness who 
originally testified against Gideon was actually a lookout for a 
group of young men who were the real perpetrators of the crime.244 
Gideon’s lawyer also introduced new key evidence from a taxi cab 
driver who drove Gideon from the pool hall on the day of the 
burglary and was able to refute the prosecution’s contention that 
Gideon was carrying stolen items when he left the pool hall. 
Counsel did a masterful job of defending Gideon245 and at the 
                                                          
243  Interestingly, the ACLU offered to represent Gideon on retrial, but 
Gideon wanted an experienced local lawyer. With Gideon’s agreement, the 
Florida court appointed W. Fred Turner, a lawyer with an excellent reputation 
for criminal defense representation in the court’s jurisdiction. See Jacob, supra 
note 8, at 257. The Gideon trial occurred five months after the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Gideon.   
244  See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (Random House 1964); 
Jacob, supra note 8, at 265.  
245 Jacob, supra note 8, at 269 (Turner did a masterful job of defending 
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conclusion of the trial the jury acquitted Gideon after only one 
hour of deliberation.246 
There is little doubt that a trained lawyer makes an important 
difference in legal proceedings. Empirical studies demonstrate that 
litigants in court and agency proceedings have a significantly 
greater chance of success when they are represented by counsel.247 
Recent articles report that “studies of courts and administrative 
agencies consistently show that indigent litigants without counsel 
routinely forfeit basic rights, not due to the facts of their cases or 
the governing law, but due to the absence of counsel.”248   
In civil forfeiture actions, courts have readily acknowledged 
the importance of counsel because the legal framework is 
complicated, the cases are fact-intensive, and claimants must assert 
affirmative defenses or otherwise they will be waived. Needless to 
say, the government is always represented by a lawyer in civil 
forfeiture cases. The truth is that in civil forfeiture cases, having 
                                                          
Gideon, proving the underlying assumption of the Supreme Court’s decision that 
“being represented by counsel makes a tremendous difference.”). 
246  LEWIS, supra note 244, at 237 (reporting that the jury went out at 4:20 
pm and at 5:25 pm there was a knock on the door between the courtroom and the 
jury room, following which the jurors filed in and the verdict was announced). 
247  See Engler, Connecting, supra note 85 (reviewing studies that show 
that absence of counsel affects outcomes in a broad range of civil legal matters); 
Kaufman, supra note 53, at 366; William Popkin, The Effect of Representation 
in Nonadversary Proceedings–A Study of Three Disability Programs, 62 
CORNELL L. REV. 989 (1977); Carroll Seron, Martin Frankel, Gregg Van Ryzin 
& Jean Kovath, The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for the Poor Tenants 
in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 419 (2001). But see D. James Griener & Cassandra Wolos 
Pattanayak, What Difference Representation? (Jan. 12, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1708664 (concluding that representation in 
administrative unemployment compensation hearings had no effect on the 
probability of success and caused delay in the resolution of unemployment 
claims). 
248  Gary Toohey, Missouri Bar Ass’n, A Civil Right to Counsel: Inevitable 
or Unrealistic, PRECEDENT, 2010, at 25–26, available at http:// 
members.mobar.org/pdfs/precedent/feb10/civil.pdf (citing  BOSTON BAR ASS’N 
TASK FORCE ON EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, GIDEON’S NEW 
TRUMPET: EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASSACHUSETTS 
(2008)).  
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counsel matters because there is so much that can be said.249   
The first decade of experience applying CAFRA’s right to 
counsel for indigent homeowners in civil forfeiture cases appears 
to lend support to the basic proposition that with counsel, the 
chances of improved outcomes and of preserving basic human 
rights are increased,250 whereas without counsel, litigants face 
worse outcomes.251 The first years under CAFRA have produced 
surprisingly few court appointments; arguably, the sample of cases 
remains too small to draw any firm conclusions. Nevertheless, the 
results are instructive.252 What limited results are available point 
                                                          
249  Oversight of Federal Asset Forfeiture: Its Role in Fighting Crime: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 85 (1999) (statement of Roger Pilon, Vice 
President for Legal Affairs, Cato Institute)  H.R. 1835, June 11, 1997 Testimony 
of Roger Pilon. 
250  See generally BOSTON BAR ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON CIVIL RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL, supra note 248; Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster & Shawn 
Bushway, Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the 
Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719 (2002) (concluding that 
when lawyers are appointed at pretrial bail hearings, large numbers of 
defendants avoided incarceration). See also Engler, Connecting, supra note 85, 
at 92 (concluding that available studies consistently reveal the importance of 
representation as an important variable in improving success rates and that 
disparities in case outcomes between represented and unrepresented parties 
shows that the presence of lawyers impacts case outcomes). 
251  See Carter, supra note 57, available at http://www.abajournal. 
com/news/article/judges_say_litigants_increasingly_going_pro_se--
at_their_own_/  (reporting the view of judges that self-representing is increasing 
and producing worse outcomes for litigants). 
252  When CAFRA was passed, the Congressional Budget Office projected 
that an automatic right to counsel involving primary residents of indigents 
would increase annual spending by approximately one million dollars over a 
five-year period. This suggested that, at fixed compensation levels established 
by the statute, LSC would be expected to represent as many as 285 eligible 
homeowners each year. See Louis S. Rulli, The Long Term Impact of CAFRA: 
Expanding Access to Counsel and Encouraging Greater Use of Criminal 
Forfeiture, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 87, 89 & n.32 (2001). For reasons that are 
unclear and beyond the scope of this article, that projection has not come to 
pass. Instead, there were only twenty-eight LSC appointments during the entire 
period from 2000–2007. See Response to Freedom of Information Request from 
Legal Services Corp. to author (May 13, 2009) (on file with author). 
RULLI - FINAL.DOC 5/9/2011  4:04 PM 
 On the Road to Civil Gideon 745 
clearly toward the conclusion that the presence of counsel affects 
outcomes.  
During the period of 2000 through mid-2007, federal courts 
appointed the Legal Services Corporation only twenty-eight times 
to represent indigent homeowners whose primary residences were 
the subject of civil forfeiture proceedings.253 Without a right to 
counsel, one might expect that roughly 80 percent of the cases 
would be uncontested or, in other words, roughly twenty-four of 
the twenty-eight cases would result in a forfeiture of property to 
the government by default.254 With appointed counsel, however, all 
of the cases were contested. In at least two of the cases, default 
judgments that had been entered originally by the court were set 
aside after counsel were appointed to represent indigent 
homeowners.255 
In many of the cases, the person alleged by the government to 
have engaged in drug trafficking and the homeowner were not the 
same person. Of the cases in which it was possible to discern from 
court filings the relationship between the alleged wrongdoer and 
homeowner, it appears that the alleged wrongdoer was the 
homeowner only 38.1 percent of the time, while in the majority of 
the cases (or 61.9 percent of the time), the alleged wrongdoer was 
someone other than the homeowner.256 Of the cases in which the 
alleged wrongdoer was not the homeowner, the alleged wrongdoer 
                                                          
253  See Response to Freedom of Information Request from Legal Services 
Corp. to author (May 13, 2009) (on file with author). 
254  Admittedly, this is a broad generalization drawn from the 80 percent 
overall uncontested rate in civil forfeiture proceedings discussed previously in 
this Article. To know whether this high uncontested rate applies equally to civil 
forfeiture cases involving primary residences of property claimants would 
require extensive empirical analysis that is beyond the scope of this article. 
255  See, e.g., United States v. Real Prop. Located at 130 High Rock Acres 
Drive, Black Mountain, N.C., No. 1:06CV290, 2007 WL 1959245, at *1 
(W.D.N.C. July 3, 2007); United States v. Real Prop. Located at 70 Centennial 
Ave., Chico, Cal., No. 08-01107 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (on file with author). 
256  It was possible to discern the relationship between the alleged drug 
trafficker and the homeowner in twenty-one of the twenty-eight cases. Of those 
twenty-one cases, the alleged drug trafficker and the homeowner were the same 
person in eight of the cases. See Response to Freedom of Information Request 
from Legal Services Corp. to author (May 13, 2009) (on file with author).  
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was a family member in 33.3 percent of the cases, involved in a 
relationship with the homeowner (but was not a family member) in 
23.8 percent of the cases, and totally unrelated to the homeowner 
in 4.7 percent of the cases. Assuming that the government is able 
to show a nexus between the illegal drug activity and the home, the 
relationship between the alleged wrongdoer and the homeowner is 
very important because of statutory defenses, such as the innocent 
owner defense, that may be asserted to prevent forfeiture. A 
homeowner should be able to prevail in court so long as he or she 
can prove they did not know of or did not consent to drug activity 
at the property. The pool of cases decided under CAFRA so far 
suggests that a meritorious innocent owner defense was available 
to homeowners in 61.9 percent of the cases, thereby validating the 
critical importance of having a lawyer present to assert and prove 
such a defense.257   
Case outcomes in this small universe of civil forfeiture cases 
also support the important role that a lawyer plays once provided 
to an indigent litigant. In some cases, the assistance of counsel 
enabled homeowners to hold the government to its legal burdens 
and ultimately to have the government’s forfeiture action 
dismissed.258 Even where criminal activity may have taken place, 
homeowners were still able to save their homes because they had 
not personally engaged in wrongdoing and their lawyers asserted 
innocent owner defenses that would have been otherwise 
waived.259 Here, legal help provided an effective means of 
checking government power and fulfilling congressional intent that 
innocent homeowners not forfeit their homes to the government. 
In still other cases, where homeowners were allegedly 
responsible for the drug activity at the property, representation by a 
lawyer permitted the parties to explore creative resolutions that 
                                                          
257  In thirteen of the twenty-one cases, the property claimant (homeowner) 
was not the alleged wrongdoer. See Response to Freedom of Information 
Request from Legal Services Corp. to author (May 13, 2009) (on file with 
author).  
258  See, e.g., United States v. Freedom, N.H., 28 Ski Doo Alley, No. 07-
0397 (D. N.H. 2007) (on file with author).    
259  See, e.g., United States v. Land and Buildings Located at 60 Sawmill 
Hill Rd., Berwick, Me., No. 06-0033 (D. N.H. 2006) (on file with author).  
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halted wrongful activity and met legitimate governmental interests, 
but at the same time protected the interests of innocent children 
residing in the property.260 In cases such as these, the real victims 
of a forfeiture of the family home to the government are the 
innocent children who then face shelter disruption, educational 
displacement, and even homelessness. With help from a lawyer, an 
indigent homeowner is not inclined to just give up, but is able to 
negotiate for a possible settlement of the forfeiture action that 
offers the promise of protecting his or her children from falling 
further into poverty. This could take the form of holding the real 
property in trust for the children, selling the property and placing 
proceeds from the sale in a trust for the children’s educational 
needs, or even refinancing the home to pay the government a sum 
of money as a substitute for forfeiture while still retaining the 
family home for the benefit of the children. The presence of 
counsel on both sides of the forfeiture action allows for meaningful 
negotiations and amicable resolutions that often better serve 
competing societal interests.261  
This type of beneficial outcome was achieved in a North 
Carolina case in which a homeowner and his girlfriend resided in 
the family home with their minor children.262 The police arrested 
the homeowner for growing marijuana at the property after they 
were called to the home in response to a domestic violence 
complaint. The government commenced a civil forfeiture action 
against the real property and, without counsel for the homeowner, 
a default judgment was entered in favor of the government. After a 
lawyer was appointed under CAFRA to represent the indigent 
homeowner, the default judgment was set aside. Soon thereafter, 
the homeowner died leaving the home to his children in his will. 
Counsel raised defenses to the forfeiture action on behalf of the 
children as property claimants and negotiated a resolution that 
                                                          
260  See, e.g., United States v. Approx. $3,432 in U.S. Currency, and 
Certain Real Prop. Commonly Known as 9665 S. Nicholson Rd., Oak Creek, 
Wis., No. 02-0926 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (on file with author).   
261  Id.   
262  United States v. Real Prop. Located at 130 High Rock Acres Drive, 
Black Mountain, N.C., No. 1:06CV290, 2007 WL 1959245, at *1 (W.D.N.C. 
July 3, 2007).  
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authorized the sale of the property with the net proceeds to be 
placed in trust for the minor children.263 Without counsel, it is 
likely that the default judgment would not have been set aside and 
the children would have been dislodged from their home without 
receiving any financial support from the equity of the property. 
It is difficult to draw firm conclusions from the relatively small 
number of case outcomes during the first seven or so years under 
CAFRA in which indigent homeowners received lawyers as a 
matter of right. Still, it is telling that of twenty-one cases in which 
a final outcome has now been reached (out of a total of twenty-
eight appointments), three cases resulted in outright dismissals of 
the forfeiture actions and fifteen more resulted in amicable 
settlements that brought modest or substantial benefit to the 
homeowner, including the retention of family homes in many of 
the cases. In approximately 43 percent of the cases reaching final 
resolution, homeowners held on to their property without any 
payment or with just a relatively small payment of settlement 
monies to the government.264 These overall outcomes would not 
                                                          
263  Consent Order and Judgment of Forfeiture May 6, 2008, Real Prop. 
Located at 130 High Rock Acres Drive, Black Mountain, N.C., 2007 WL 
1959245 (court order available from the PACER court document database). 
264  In reviewing the twenty-eight cases provided by the Legal Services 
Corporation in response to the author’s freedom of information request, 
outcomes were coded in seven classifications: actions still ongoing, rulings in 
favor of the U.S., rulings in favor of the property claimant, settlements in favor 
of the U.S., settlements slightly in favor of the property claimant, settlements 
substantially in favor of the property claimant, and unavailable (documents 
sealed). Codings were based entirely upon document review obtained from the 
PACER court document database. Admittedly, discretion was used in 
classifying settlement outcomes as favorable to the U.S. or slightly or 
substantially favorable to the property claimant. The category of settlement 
outcome favorable to the U.S. was used when all of the property in question was 
forfeited to the U.S., with the claimant receiving nothing, or when the settlement 
amount was the equivalent of the value of the property. The category of 
settlement outcome slightly favorable to the property claimant was used when 
the claimant had to pay a substantial amount in lieu of forfeiting the property, or 
when the property was sold with the claimant receiving a right to some portion 
of the proceeds. The category of settlement outcome substantially favorable to 
the property claimant was used when the claimant only had to pay a modest 
amount in lieu of forfeiture of the property, or if the property was dismissed 
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have been possible without a right to counsel. 
The fifth lesson from civil forfeiture reform is that case 
outcomes are directly affected by having a trained lawyer at one’s 
side. Congress understood this basic proposition when it insisted 
that indigent homeowners have a right to counsel as a vital part of 
its reform legislation. It recognized that providing counsel to the 
poor offered indigent homeowners the best chance of ensuring that 
reform measures succeeded, that an unacceptably-high uncontested 
rate in civil forfeiture actions decreased, and most significantly that 
family homes received adequate legal protection from erroneous 
government forfeiture. Moreover, the early data demonstrates that 
concerns expressed to Congress that a right to counsel would be 
abused or would unduly burden the courts were unfounded. While 
final tallies of case outcomes are still unfolding, the early data 
suggests that Congress’ judgment was absolutely correct.    
CONCLUSION 
Federal civil forfeiture reform offers important lessons for the 
civil Gideon movement. In the twenty-one years between the 
Supreme Court’s rulings in Betts v. Brady and Gideon v. 
Wainwright, there were substantial developments in the states that 
expanded the provision of counsel at public expense in criminal 
matters and created a climate that made the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in Gideon possible. With each local expansion, 
the national movement for a right to counsel in serious criminal 
proceedings grew stronger.   
Almost thirty years after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the movement to obtain 
a civil right to counsel where basic human needs are at stake has 
found new momentum. The enactment of a statutory right to 
counsel as part of federal civil forfeiture reform adds significantly 
to this movement and provides valuable lessons on the dynamics of 
successful legislative change. While CAFRA provides a statutory 
right to counsel only for indigent property owners whose primary 
                                                          
from the proceeding as part of the settlement agreement. See Response to 
Freedom of Information Request from Legal Services Corp. to author (May 13, 
2009) (on file with author). 
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residences are at risk, and does not protect all property owners in 
federal forfeiture proceedings (or for that matter in the much larger 
number of state forfeiture cases where the property interests of 
indigents are at greatest risk), the enactment of this limited federal 
right to counsel is still a powerful illustration of the vital role that 
lawyers play to ensure that the poor have meaningful access to the 
civil justice system and are able to protect their most important 
interests.   
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services is most assuredly the 
civil parallel to Betts v. Brady. Just as Betts before it, Lassiter tilts 
the scales away from justice for millions of poor Americans when 
their most basic human needs are at stake. If judges are to 
“administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right 
to the poor and to the rich,” as their oath requires, they need to 
preside over fair contests in which the poor have the benefit of a 
lawyer.265 The road to a civil Gideon may be difficult and long, but 
with each newly-created civil right to counsel in diverse subject 
areas of state and federal law, our nation draws closer to delivering 
on its promise of equal justice under law.   
 
                                                          
265 Supreme Court justices each take this oath as provided for in Title 28, 
Chapter I, Part 453 of the U.S. Code Oaths of Justices and Judges, 28 U.S.C.A § 
453 (West 2010). 
